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ABSTRACT
The Defense Intelligence Agency:
An In-depth Study of the 
Development of the 
Intelligence 
Agency
by
Stacie D. Neff
Dr. Andrew Tuttle. Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Political Science 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis will examine the history of intelligence leading to the creation o f DIA, 
DIA’s changing and emerging roles, its missions and organization, agency contribution 
during military operations, criticisms o f the agency, and lastly the intelligence outlook for 
the future o f  DIA. Since its creation in 1961, DIA has undergone numerous 
reorganizations in This thesis will examine the history o f  intelligence leading to the 
creation of the attempts to streamline intelligence and provide the best product possible. 
Most o f these changes have occurred after major campaigns in which intelligence either 
failed, was inaccurate or could have played a better or bigger role in the campaigns: 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Grenada, and Desert Storm are some examples. Today 
DIA, as a powerful intelligence agency, plays a significant role in the intelligence 
community.
Il l
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Prior to World War H, intelligence was valued mostly for its tactical use, ie. target 
information and troop movements, and was limited mostly to war time use. However, 
with the start o f the Cold War in the 1950s, the need for strategic intelligence arose 
thereby creating the need for centralized agencies to provide assessments to political and 
military leadership. This trend began with the creation o f  the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) under the National Security Act o f 1947 and effectively ended with the creation of 
the newest major member o f the intelligence community, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) in 1961.
The DIA, created nearly 15 years after its main rival, the CIA, was a product o f  
the concept o f  a centralized defense intelligence organization. The question of a more 
streamlined military intelligence system had been under study since before the end of 
World War H. Two major themes stood out prior to the creation o f  DIA; a lack of 
management efficiency in military intelligence and the often-poor quality products they 
produced.' Each military service maintained its own intelligence branches, concentrating 
on its own particular needs. This caused conflicting intelligence estimates to national
' Allen, Deane J . , “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA,” (Defense Intelligence Agency: 
Historian Office, Nov 1995), pg. I.
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leadership, and duplication of effort. The separate military intelligence units were not 
eliminated with the creation o f DIA, however, DIA took over their representation in the 
high coimcils o f  the intelligence community.  ^ Further, there existed the need for 
centralized foreign and military intelligence which could effectively meet the requirements 
o f the Secretary o f Defense, the Joint Chiefe o f Staff (JCS), the Unified and Specified 
Commands as well as numerous other defense and non-defense agencies.^ Up until the 
creation o f DIA, no central organization existed to give national decision-makers fused, 
all-source military intelligence. On August 1, 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara announced his decision to create the Defense Intelligence Agency and on 
October 1, 1961, it became operational. It was not a single event that led to the creation 
o f DIA, but rather a dawning of a new era in the political, military and social environments 
that necessitated its creation.
Intelligence: A Definition 
To better understand the basis o f the Defense Intelligence Agency, a few key 
concepts o f intelligence must first be considered. The concept o f  intelligence has been 
defined in many ways and is often debated among scholars due to the many aspects o f the 
concept. It is true in feet that the word intelligence can have numerous meanings from 
simple -  intelligence is information that someone wants or needs -  to more specific 
definitions as defined by Jeffrey Richelson -  intelligence is the “product resulting from the
 ^Ransom, Harvey H. The Intelligence Establishment. (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), 104.
 ^Allen, “Overview o f the Origins of DIA”, 1.
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collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation o f available 
information concerning foreign countries or a re a s .D e s p ite  its endless possible 
definitions, intelligence may best be defined by Jennifer Sims as “information collected, 
organized or analyzed on behalf of actors or decision makers.”  ^ This simple description 
identifies the activity, conducted by someone or some organization, o f seeking out 
relevant information and providing it to leadership assisting in the development o f national 
strategy/policy.
Elements o f  Intelligence 
In an effort to better define the craft o f intelligence, Abram Shulsky identifies four 
elements o f intelligence: collection, analysis, covert action, and coimterintelligence. 
Collection is the process o f gathering raw (or unanalyzed) material through a variety of 
methods including photography, interception o f communications, espionage, and open 
sources such as any type o f publication. However, without the second element of 
intelligence, analysis, this raw material is rarely useful. Analysis includes making 
“judgements about the capabilities, intentions, and actions o f another party.”*
Covert action is a more interactive element o f intelligence, seeking to directly 
influence political events. Shulsky describes it as “any activity midway between diplomacy
* Richelson, Jeffrey T., The US Intelligence Communitv. (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 
1995), p. 2.
’ Shulsky, Abram N. and Jennifer Sims, What is Intelligence. (Washington, DC: 
Consortium for the Study o f Intelligence, 1993), p. 2.
* Shulsky, Abram N., Silent Warfare. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991), p. 8.
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and war”’ which is carried out in anonymity -  meaning it is not public knowledge nor is it 
readily apparent. Counterintelligence, the last element o f intelligence is the protection o f 
the society as well as protection o f the society’s intelligence gathering capabilities from 
hostile intent. The four elements described here better define what intelligence is and 
what it does to protect, serve and ensure that leadership makes well-informed decisions 
regarding national strategy and policy.
Categories o f  Intelligence
In addition to these elements, there are several categories o f intelligence. Jeffrey 
Richelson defines six categories, four o f which are: political, military, scientific and 
technological, and economic. Political intelligence encompasses both domestic and 
international politics.* It is important for the U.S. to be aware o f the ever-evolving 
relations between countries around the world in order to make international policy. 
Domestically, the stability of a certain country affects international relations. For example 
Poland, once a Warsaw Pact country under Communism is now an upcoming member o f 
NATO, changing U.S. relations and support to Poland. In addition, a domestic crisis in a 
foreign country could spur US involvement in humanitarian or military aid. Therefore, 
changes within a nation can severely affect U.S. relations with that country and/or its 
neighbors.
Military intelligence is the most obvious in importance of intelligence categories. 
Military capabilities o f potential adversaries must be studied to provide the U.S. military
"Ibid.
* Richelson, The US Intelligence Communitv. 7-8.
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establishment with a basis not for only budgeting for forces and new weapon systems, but 
also for training, equipping and arming U.S. troops. Additionally, military intelligence is 
important in assessing the balance o f power between nations (such as Iran/Iraq) whose 
conflict may affect the United States.’
Scientific and technological developments in both the military and civilian sector 
are m ^ rta n t. Obviously military technological developments are o f concern to the U.S. 
when trying to stay ahead of the “arms race.” However, civilian scientific and 
technological advances may also have military implications. For example, a country 
developing nuclear power for the first time as a power source, might also use that reactive 
material to build weapons o f mass destruction, therefore giving the world a new nuclear 
capable coimtry and changing the balance o f power in a particular region as a result.
Economic intelligence concerns international development o f economic 
organizations, such as OPEC or ASEAN. Rates o f production, consumption, pricing and 
trade embargoes affect the world market and could in the event of a major economic 
collapse o f a coimtry affect the balance o f power in a particular region. In addition, these 
economic arrangements often have underlying military implications to include military 
alliances. These categories emphasize the need for intelligence today in order to have as 
clear a picture as possible into a highly dynamic world arena to once again ensure sound 
policy making in pursuit o f  national security.
Ibid, 8.
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Strategic and Tactical Intelligence 
Intelligence plays numerous roles in the pursuit o f  national security. Decision­
makers use intelligence at different levels: strategic and tactical At the strategic level, 
intelligence includes “evaluated information needed at high-level policy-making levels for 
the economic allocation o f resources” toward the formulation o f national objectives and 
the execution o f those ob jec tives.S tra teg ic  intelligence is produced and used mainly at 
decision-making levels to guide national strategy in peace or wartime. This type o f 
intelligence is organized into three basic categories, as described by Harry Ransom, a 
noted scholar o f  intelligence: generalized information, current estimate information, and 
evaluative information." The basic information most often pertains to known data such as 
a coimtry’s population, ethnic origin, and other statistics which are produced in regular 
publications. Current intelligence comes in a variety o f forms ranging from raw, 
unevaluated data to coordinated National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) produced by a 
variety o f analysts from different agencies to provide the best overall analysis o f a 
developing situation. In addition the most typical type of current intelligence comes in 
the form of daily, weekly or monthly reports, estimates or briefings to decision-makers. 
These regular updates keep commanders informed on specific developments or on 
worldwide trends ensuring the decision-maker is well informed to do his job. Evaluative 
intelligence is making educated predictions on the course o f events relating to a particular 
subject, such as when a weak government may feU, or the direction a regional conflict may
Ransom, Harry H. “Strategic Intelligence”, (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning 
Press, 1973), p. 2.
" Ibid., 5.
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turn. These evaluations are also included in the current intelligence estimates given to 
commanders and in NIE’s presented to high level decision-makers. Strategic intelligence 
in the course o f its evaluations, often overlaps with tactical level intelligence methods.
Tactical intelligence, often referred to as operational intelligence, is, for the most 
part, used Ijy military commanders at the “local” or operational level. Tactical intelligence 
includes a more specific, detailed look at enemy capabilities in order to train in peacetime 
or plan campaigns in wartime. These include orders o f Ixittie detailing the military 
strength o f a country, operational capabilities, defensive posturing and other important 
military fectors needed for military commanders to conduct operations and meet national 
objectives. The same current intelligence briefed to high level decision-makers is also 
available to lower level commanders giving them the same knowledge o f major 
developments for planning and training purposes. It is easy to see that the overlap 
between strategic and tactical intelligence occurs regularly depending on the amount of 
information the decision-maker requires to formulate his objectives.
History: 1917-1961 
Intelligence Prior to and during WWI 
Prior to World War H, intelligence organizations were for the most part small 
divisions o f the military branches and relatively unimportant due to the popular ideas of 
isolationism during this period in U.S. history. The Office o f Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
was formed by the Navy in 1882 for the purpose o f gathering and processing information 
on technological naval advances around the world, and thereby the U.S. Navy became the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
first to establish a military intelligence agency. ”  The Army organized the Military 
Intelligence Division (MID) in 1885 to collect and disseminated foreign intelligence. (The 
MID later became the G-2 in 1903.) However, despite the creation o f these agencies, 
both were sparsely staffed making them essentially ineffective. In 1917, when the U.S. 
entered WWI, American intelligence resources were not extensive enough, largely as a 
result o f undermanning, to provide the tactical information the commander’s required. In 
the early years o f World War I, U.S. commanders overseas tended to rely on foreign 
British and French intelligence assessments for tactical estimates.'^
However, as WWI progressed, the Army’s G-2 grew in size and capabilities and 
earned a reputation for its advances in the cryptological field (coding and decoding secure 
transmissions, the first SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)). By 1918, G-2 was one o f  the four 
divisions o f  the Army’s General Staff responsible for “ planning, coordinating, and 
supervising military intelligence.” Despite its avid growth and accomplishments diuing 
the war, the G-2 waned in the postwar years, mainly as a result o f the negative American 
attitude toward continued involvement in international relations after the war. However, 
both the ONI and G-2 continued to operate and as World War II began in Europe, the 
intelligence community started to grow by leaps and bounds.
Ameringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History. 
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 66.
Ameringer, 110.
" Ibid., 111.
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Attempts to Establish Joint Intelligence 
The direct origins o f DIA and the need for a unified military intelligence 
organization can be traced to the late 1930s and early 1940s. In Jime o f 1939, President 
Roosevelt established the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee consisting of the FBI, 
G-2 and ONI for the purpose o f investigating matters of espionage, counterespionage, and 
sabotage. ONI was responsible for the Pacific; G-2 took responsibility for Europe,
Africa, and the Canal Zone and the FBI was responsible for the Western Hemisphere.
This committee created the basis for integration of intelligence efforts while maintaining 
separate intelligence organizations.'^
Two years later, in 1941, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was established 
and broadened the idea o f integration, acting as a coordinating organization to advise the 
Joint Chiefe o f Staff. The JIC consisted o f the directors/representatives from the 
intelligence branches o f the Army, Navy, State Department, Board o f Economic Welfare, 
and the Coordinator of Information (COI).'* The CO I, the forerunner o f  the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), was headed by William Donovan, who later became the head of 
the OSS in 1942. The COI, unlike the OSS, reported directly to the President and was 
financed in “unvouchered funds” '’ The working body of the JIC itself, was the Joint 
Intelligence Subcommittee Staff which became the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) or J-2. 
Reports firom the JIC and the J-2 went directly to the JCS creating a dual chain of
" Ibid., 125.
'* Allen, “Overview of the Origins o f DIA”, 2.
Andrew. Christopher. For the President’s Eves Only, (New York; Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1995), 127.
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reporting; a recurrii% concept in defense intelligence.'* The JIC failed to successfully 
unify military intelligence because it lacked the authority to combine the efforts and 
estimates of the three services. However, the concept behind its creation served as an 
important organizational precedent for the creation o f DIA.
Intelligence Failures o f Pearl Harbor 
The feilure o f Pearl Harbor was a failure o f intelligence analysis; the ability to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant material, according to one historian. As WWII 
approached, the American intelligence community consisted of: the FBI, ONI, G-2, as 
well as the two SIGINT sections Signals Intelligence Section (SIS) and the Code and 
Signals Section (OP-20-G) which were controlled by the .\rmy and Navy branches, 
respectively. Although the two SIGINT sections o f the Army and Navy did cooperate 
with each other, they did so rather haphazardly and amidst inter-service rivalry. The 
sheer number o f messages decoded from Japan (code-named MAGIC) were too great in 
number to all be read and were routinely hand selected for the leadership to read. Yet, 
there was no one coded message from the Japan that would have given the U.S. an 
absolute indication o f attack on Pearl. However, perhaps if they had all been read, or if 
someone had noticed the increase in volume o f messages in the days that preceded Pearl, 
the shear yield of the information may have been enough to indicate the impending 
attack.'’ Roberta Wohlstetter, concludes that “ we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for
'* Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 3. 
’’ Ameringer, 134.
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Ha want o f the relevant materials, but because o f a plethora o f  irrelevant ones.”’° Pearl 
Harbor starkly illustrated the lack o f attention and resources as well as the shortcomings 
o f U.S. intelligence. What Pearl Harbor did for the intelligence community was to bolster 
the creation o f an agency which was the predecessor o f  the CIA as well as lay the 
groundwork for the creation o f  the DIA -  givii% intelligence a permanent presence in the 
postwar America.
Creation o f the Office o f Strategic Services 
In 1942, the COI was redesigned into the OSS, largely because o f  President 
Roosevelt’s lack o f  confidence in the COI in the aftermath o f the intelligence feilure at 
Pearl Harbor as well as a result o f the “tiu f battles” which continued to fragment the 
intelligence community. The new organization was tasked with collecting and analyzing 
“strategic information” as well as planning and operating “special services” and reported 
to the Joint Chiefs o f Staff instead o f FDR himself.”  The OSS was America’s first real 
“spy” agency, and was headed by former COI director, William Donovan. The OSS had 
two main components for accomplishing its mission; the Intelligence and Operations 
components, each supervised by deputy directors. The organization was further 
structured by Donovan into branches which conducted research and analysis, espionage, 
and black propaganda (information designed to appear as if it came fi*om enemy 
sources).”  Under the Intelligence Component, the Communications Branch was in charge 
o f processing and delivering messages, providing secure communications between the
“  Andrew, 120. 
Andrew, 131.
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OSS and Washington as well as overseas. The Research and Analysis Branch designed 
“spy paraphernalia”, and special weapons for agents in the field. Within the Research and 
Development (R & D )  branch the Documentation and Camouflage divisions created 
“agent authentication.” The Secret Intelligence Branch conducted espionage and 
operated out o f an extensive network o f stations in mostly neutral coimtries. The 
Coimter-Espionage Branch (X-2) was a clandestine service which “spied on Axis secret 
services in order to prevent penetration o f  U.S. and Allied intelligence” i.e., the double 
agent. The Research and Analysis Section was the heart o f  the Intelligence component 
gathering information and producing comprehensive intelligence products.”
Within the Operational Component o f the OSS fell the Special Operations Branch 
(SO) which housed small teams o f agents who conducted sabotage behind enemy lines as 
well as the Operational Group which trained guerilla units and the Marine Unit which 
performed similar functions as the SO in the marine arena. The final part o f the 
Operational component was the Morale Operations Branch which conducted the black 
propaganda.’'*
One of the main problems o f the OSS was its extreme compartmentalization which 
complicated communication between branches within the OSS. In addition, the creation 
o f the OSS did little to end the continual conflict within the intelligence community.
Do VO van’s ideas to further centralize intelligence were not taken well and his main 
supporter, President Roosevelt died before any further action could be taken toward 
expanding the powers o f the OSS. The OSS’s continual competition with the military
^  Ameringer, 162-167. 
""Ibid., 168-172.
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intelligence branches and Truman’s inexperience in intelligence policy and power along 
with his disdain for espionage ultimately led to disbandment o f the OSS in September of 
1945/^ Upon its disbandment, the Research and Analysis branch was transferred to the 
State Department and Secret Intelligence Branch and X-2 were tasked to the War 
Department.
In January 1946, President Truman authorized the consideration of a post-war 
intelligence organization for the coordination, planning, evaluation and dissemination of 
intelligence based on recommendations o f the 1945 Eberstadt Report. Out o f this 
consideration came the National Intelligence Authority, a senior executive body, and its 
operational element, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).^^ In addition, Truman 
appointed the first Director o f  Central Intelligence, Admiral Sidney Sours to head the 
CIG. Both groups were budgeted and manned by the War and State departments, 
therefore, both departments retained control over their own resources. As a result, there 
was still no real integration o f intelligence servicing agencies.
Despite efforts to establish an independent intelligence agency during the 1945- 
1947 period, the War and State departments fought and convinced national leaders that 
each department should retain autonomy o f its intelligence fimctions although they 
acknowledged that greater coordination was needed.^’
Allen., “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 2. 
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Ransom, 103.
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National Security Act o f  1947 
As a result o f WWII, the nature o f the United States power and influence was 
globally widened and by 1947 there was a growing realization that in order to keep up 
with all o f  the post WWn challenges, integration o f services intelligence as well as joint 
operations was essential. The National Security Act o f  1947 was an essential first step. 
This act for the first time consolidated the separate military services into the National 
Military Establishment, created the National Security Council (NSC) — an advisory 
group to the President — and established the Central Intelligence Agency (replacing the 
CIG). It also gave the CIA and the Director o f Central Intelligence (DCI) the 
responsibility for coordinating intelligence activities o f  all government agencies.^* Despite 
this charter, and due partly to the vagueness o f the provision that established the CIA, the 
military services continued to, for the most part, retain control over military intelligence 
collection as no agency had been established to centralize their independent collections.
As a result, the function o f the CIA came to be that o f  a “ “coordinator” in a 
confederation o f departmental intelligence organizations.” ’^ As a result, when DIA was 
created, it was designed as a union—not a confederation o f defense intelligence activities.
Central Intelligence Agency 
The National Security Act o f  1947 charged the CIA with coordinating intelligence 
activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence information in the 
pursuit o f National Security. In addition, the agency was to perform other duties as
28 Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f  DIA”, 2
”  Ibid.
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directed by the National Security Council It was this charter function that laid the 
groundwork for authorizing covert action. The position o f Director o f Central 
Intelligence was created and was responsible for protecting intelligence sources and 
methods. The agency was further tasked, although in hindsight ineffectively, to centralize 
intelligence activities. CIA was “to perform for the benefit o f  the existing intelligence 
agencies such additional services o f common concern as the < N S O  determines can be 
more effectively accomplished centrally.” *^’ However, despite this provision, the inter­
service intelligence agencies had been disagreeing for years and the establishment of the 
CIA did nothing to reverse that trend. For exan^le, the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
estimates on the capabilities o f  the Soviets as well as their intentions were widely varied, 
presenting basic problems in coordination among intelligence agencies.^' Therefore at the 
first meeting o f the NSC, in September o f 1947, the DCI presented a plan for centralizing 
the efforts o f  the intelligence community which was approved in December of that same 
year. Essentially, the heads o f  the armed service intelligence branches, the State 
Department’s Office o f Intelligence and Research, the FBI and the Atomic Energy 
Commission comprised the Intelligence Advisory Committee (LAC) lead by the DCI. A 
second NSC direction in January of 1948, specified the types o f intelligence estimates to 
be coordinated within the lAC. Despite these efforts, it remained extremely difficult to 
achieve cooperation on national intelligence estimates fi-om all members o f the intelligence
30 Richelson, The US Intelligence Communitv. 13.
Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
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com m uni ty .T h is  theme reigned in endless subsequent investigations and reports on the 
efforts of the CIA to coordinate intelligence from 1948 until the creation o f DIA in 1961.
1948 Hoover Commission 
In 1948, Truman appointed Herbert Hoover to determine if the provisions of the 
1947 National Security Act actually did what it had it been conceived to do — provide a 
conçrehensive program for the future security o f the US. The commission determined 
not only that the National Military Establishment lacked centralized authority, but more 
in^K)rtantly, that individual service intelligence branches were subjective, biased, 
inadequate, and reeked o f wasteful duplication, unsatisfoctory coordination and conflicting 
intelligence estimates.^^ Each service regularly used its own intelligence system for 
budgeteering purposes; the Air Force saw a need for extensive numbers o f  bombers and 
strategic missiles to counter their perceived threat, while the Navy and Army exaggerated 
Soviet fire power, all o f  which led to inflated budgets for the armed services at a time 
when funds were decreasing. Furthermore, it was determined that the JCS was “too 
remote” from the related intelligence groups such as the NSC and the CIA. The Hoover 
Commission emphasized that teamwork was necessary between related intelligence 
functions and advised such coordinating control be managed by the Secretary of 
Defense.Ultimately, the commission recommended creation o f an agency, under the 
Secretary of Defense, for coordinating inter-service intelligence activities which led to the
Ibid., 9.
”  Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 3.
Ibid., 3.
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1949 amendments to the National Security Act o f 1947 as well as the creation o f the 
Central Intelligence Act o f 1949/^ This new act provided for better coordination in the 
JCS and permitted the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures in 
the expenditure o f federal funds. It provided the basis for the authority to maintain 
secrecy o f the CIA’s budget, as well as its functions, names, organization, etc. However, 
despite the feet that the Hoover commission determined the need centralized military 
intelligence, another twelve years would pass before the establishment o f DIA.
Start o f the Cold War 1950s 
The beginning o f the Cold War started the arms race with the first atomic bomb 
and continued into the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and space programs of 
the 1950s to 1980s. This exploding technological race served to restrain cooperation 
between services once again. Technology was expensive, and government resources at 
this time were diminishing which resulted in competition for project funding. Inter-service 
rivalry over specialized intelligence functions also emerged most noticeably in the debate 
over the service's participation in the targeting function. The Air Force had been given 
this function in 1947, and had maintained a joint effort in the process until 1952, when the 
new Air Force director o f intelligence expressed a desire to staff the section with Air 
Force personnel only. The other services protested, noting their vested interest in the 
targeting function as well. From this controversy, a new activity for the JIC was created— 
to provide for partial joint participation in the area o f air intelligence. This joint activity in 
air intelligence continued up until the establishment o f DIA. Also in 1953, the Secretary
35 Ibid., 4.
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o f Defense created the position o f  Assistant to the Secretary o f  Defense for Special 
Operations (OSO) as an arm to recommend policies, review and provide guidance on 
program development o f aU Department o f Defense (DoD) components and develop DoD 
positions on intelligence programs, making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 
It was to be a coordination point for all DoD intelligence, however, the OSO lacked the 
authority to accomplish such coordination. Despite shortfeUs, this was the first DoD 
effort to coordinate defense intelligence.^* For the most part, during this period fi-om 
1949-1955, the plague of inaccurate intelligence and duplication o f effort continued with 
no fiuther studies or attempts made to integrate the military intelligence system.
Creation o f the National Security Agency
In the early 1950s as well, the National Security Agency (NSA) was created
(November 4, 1952) in response to a Top Secret directive. NSA took over the
responsibilities o f the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) established in 1949 in an
attençt to integrate the cryptologic effort among the defense organizations. It controlled
all SIGINT activities through the Central Security Service (CSS) which represented the
various service SIGINT requirements and assets and was headed by the NSA Director
who reported directly to the Secretary o f Defense. NSA’s mission;
. . .  is directed to foreign intelligence obtained fi-om foreign electrical 
communications and also fi-om other foreign signals such as radars. The foreign 
intelligence derived fi-om these signals is then reported to various agencies o f the 
government in response to their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.^’
'* Ibid., 5.
”  Fain, Tyrus G., The Intelligence Communitv: History. Orpanization. and Issues. 
(London: R.R. Bowker Company, 1977), 303.
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“On the surfece, it appeared that a model for jointly manned, centralized intelligence 
activity under DoD had been established.” *^ However, there were numerous obvious 
differences between the new NSA and what would become DIA. The principle difference 
was in the conq)etition for resources. NSA’s functions were highly specialized, making 
few demands on the military departments for resources or manpower. Conversely, when 
DIA was created, its missions were broad and the new agency dependent on the services 
for resources and staffing. Additionally, the classified organization did not have to 
compete for funds with the services, as it’s resources came fi-om classified funding, unlike 
DIA which competed among other government agencies for monies. Also, because o f its 
highly specialized mission, the demands on the agency were not as intense as the demands 
on DIA would be in times o f crisis. NSA provided a part o f the intelligence picture that 
DIA would be required to interpret and disseminate to its users. Where DIA would 
experience criticism over its performance, NSA, as a secret agency was very much 
protected from a majority o f that criticism. Technically, NSA was the first DoD 
intelligence organization combining efforts o f the four services, but due to its unilateral 
secrecy, it didn’t experience the difficulties that DIA would in the struggle for survival and 
legitimacy.
1955 Hoover Commission 
This second Hoover Commission was created to make recommendations on the 
structure and administration o f the intelligence community and its final report received 
much debate in Congress. The commission warned o f the need for more intelligence
Allen. Deane J. “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational 
Overview”, (Washington, D C.: DIA, 1983), p. 20.
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collection on Russia and China — behind the Iron Curtain. It once again, noted the lack 
o f  accountability in the current intelligence system, and therefore, a need for better 
organizational structure in order to adequately keep astride o f technological advancements 
around the world.^’ Partly as a result o f  this commission and the widely held belief that 
major revision was needed in the Defense Department (to provide more efficient products 
and eliminate duplication) came the Department o f Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958.
Department o f Defense Reorganization o f 1958 
This act did not specifically call for a consolidated DoD intelligence organization, 
despite its provisions. The main goal was to streamline channels o f authority in the DoD 
without disrupting the individual authority o f the military departments by extreme 
consolidation.'** The act did move the decision making arm from the individual military 
branches into the hands of the JCS and the Secretary o f Defense and provided a chain o f 
command for decision making. Prior to the act, each branch’s intelligence departments 
submitted intelligence reports directly to the Secretary o f Defense. The JCS was now 
responsible for coordinating intelligence estimates and providing intelligence to the 
Secretary o f Defense through the former JIG, now J-2. Size limitations of the J-2, 
however, ultimately sent some o f the “weeding out” process back down to the individual 
services elements resulting in unresolved differences over programs and plans and foiled, 
once again, to produce timely and credible intelligence estimates.*’ Thus, the system
Richelson, The US Intelligence Cnmmunitv. 42.
40Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 6.
*’lbid.
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continued to be duplicative, cumbersome, and uncoordinated for the most part. Despite 
its shortcomings, this act was the first major reorganization o f the Defense Department 
since its inception in 1947 and it established the unquestionable authority o f the Secretary 
o f  Defense and placed the JCS in the chain o f command for decision making.
Also rooted in the Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958 was the creation the 
United States Intelligence Board (USEB), created by a National Security Council directive 
in September o f 1958, replacing the former lAC fi-om 1948. This board represented the 
highest level o f  intelligence coordination and included representatives from: the JCS, 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Department o f State, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy 
Commission, FBI as well as the Assistant to the Secretary o f Defense for Special 
Operations and the Director of the National Security Agency as equal members.*^ The 
USIB provided guidance to the intelligence community regarding requirements and 
priorities as well as coordinating intelligence activities and issuing National Intelligence 
Estimates (NIE). This board combined service and outside intelligence elements with 
senior national defense representatives for the first time.*^
Joint Study Group o f 1959/1960 
Still faced with continued “disparate estimates o f Soviet missile strength from each 
o f the armed services: the US Intelligence Board created a Joint Study Group (JSG) in 
1959 to study the intelligence agencies.”** The Secretary directed the JCS to identify the
The Secretary o f Defense for Special Operations position was eliminated in 1961, when 
DIA replaced its seat on the USIB.
Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f  DIA”, 28.
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intelligence requirements for all military departments in an effort to reduce duplication and 
prioritize requirements. The Joint Study Group (JSG) was a special task force under the 
chairmanship o f Lyman Kirkpatrick (former CIA Inspector General) to review military 
intelligence coordination.*^ Once again, an attempt was made to centralize military 
intelligence. At this time, service channels still followed the same chain o f  command used 
since WWn and although the DoD Reorganization Act had streamlined the chain at the 
upper end, it still needed one centralized point o f  control capable o f taking in, organizing 
and disseminating intelligence information for the military intelligence community. Thus, 
came the notion for the Defense Intelligence Agency. However, the group also 
recognized the obstacles o f creating such an agency. With the specialized missions o f  each 
military branch, it would be difficult to have one agency understanding and coordinating 
all branches.** The final recommendation o f the JSG provided that the Secretary of 
Defense take appropriate action to bring the military intelligence organization under the 
Department o f Defense within the concept o f  the Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958.
This program would include:
1. Establishment o f review authority o f all military intelligence programs, 
providing coordination o f all foreign intelligence activities.
2. Authority o f the JCS would be strengthened by requiring the JCS to coordinate 
intelligence views, specifically estimates with the DoD, and provide guidance to 
specified commands
** Ibid.
** Ibid.
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3. Increased intelligence resources should be drawn from existing resources.
4. Intelligence guidance to c o n ^ n en ts  o f unified commands should be passed 
through the J-2*’
The JCS was concerned with some o f these recommendations, notably that this process 
should be a result o f careful planning so as not to lose valuable intelligence as the changes 
occurred. In January 1961, the JCS suggested to the Secretary that such changes should 
be made, but only after a carefiil plan was developed by the Joint Chiefs. Meanwhile, two 
o f the services reacted to the JSG recommendations with their own ideas for control and 
coordination o f  the intelligence efforts. However, before the separate services could 
present their ideas, the new Secretary o f Defense, Robert McNamara, decided to establish 
a defense intelligence agency stemming from within the JCS.**
The Creation o f DIA - 1961 
On March 2, 1961, the JCS, under direction from McNamara to present a concept 
for a defense intelligence agency, sent recommendations for the creation o f  a Military 
Intelligence Agency (MIA). The MIA would include estimating, targeting, and basic 
intelligence functions, but would leave the individual military departments in charge of 
acquiring, producing, and disseminating intelligence as required to fulfill their 
departmental missions. The JCS envisioned an MIA which did not call for total 
integration.*’ Three critical points o f contention arose among the JCS and the Secretary
’^Allen, “Overview o f the Origins o f DIA”, 8. 
'Ib id ., 9.
' ’Richelson, The US Intelligence Commimitv. 43.
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o f Defense in the forming o f the new agency. An extensive debate ensued on whether the 
agency should be under the JCS and if it was placed under their jurisdiction, how would 
they manage, direct and oversee the intelligence activities o f the services. Ultimately, this 
chain o f command, under the JCS, was justified on the terms o f the DoD Reorganization 
Act o f 1958 which specifically tasked the Joint Chiefo with responsibility for strategic 
planning. Secondly, the Secretary was concerned over how the JCS would run the 
organization -  as a confederation rather than a genuine union. To emphasis this point, the 
Secretary insisted on the name Defense Intelligence Agency rather than the proposed 
MIA, stressing the idea of a union o f  defense intelligence activities. McNamera was 
concerned lest this new agency be a confederation instead o f a union. He insisted on the 
name DIA, implying it was a defense, not a military agency, controlled by the DoD, not 
the services. Further noted was that the DIA/MIA director should be allowed to closely 
monitor separate military intelligence activities and should be authorized to eliminate 
duplication, review all service programs and assign priorities as needed in order to prevent 
repeating the historical precedence o f  duplication and inconsistent reports.^* Lastly, the 
Secretary insisted on a timetable outlining the progression of the agency’s integration and 
the resources they would need to accomplish the goals set for the new organization. The 
final result was a compromise and on July 5, 1961, McNamara suggested an agency which 
would report to the Secretary o f Defense and through the JCS. On August 1, 1961 
McNamera formally established the Defense Intelligence Agency via DoD directive 
5105.21 as a DoD agency making it responsible for:
Allen, “Overview of the Origins o f  DIA”, 10.
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1. Organization, direction, management and control o f  all DoD intelligence 
resources.
2. Review and coordination o f DoD intelligence functions retained by Military 
Departments.
3. Supervision o f  the execution of all plans, policies and procedures exercising 
maximum economy and efficiency o f all intelligence resources.
4. Responding to all priority requests by US Intelligence Board and fulfilling 
intelligence requirements o f major DoD components.^’
The services transferred intelligence fimctions and resources to the new agency on a “time 
phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness o f defense intelligence.” ’^ 
With this directive, DIA finally brought military intelligence under a single umbrella, 
coordinating collection, analysis and dissemination o f critical intelligence that would 
efficiently serve commanders, the JCS and the president.
Until the creation o f D IA  military intelligence was not fully in accordance with the 
National Security Act o f 1947 - the goal of which was to provide security for the United 
States. Intelligence was fragmented and difficult to use by top military and political 
leaders. The origin o f  DIA from 1941 to 1961 emerged from twenty years o f inadequate, 
incoherent, and fiagmented intelligence collection and dissemination. After thirty-five 
years o f development, DIA has become the authoritative source for defense intelligence. 
With all o f  the individual services represented, DIA provides daily air, ground and naval
"Richelson, The US Intelligence Communitv. 43-44.
Department o f Defense, “35 Year History o f DIA”, (Washington D C .: DIA History 
Office, 1996), p .l.
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intelligence estimates to national leadership. This exchange provides for the most reliable, 
and consistent military intelligence ever available.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 2 
DIA: EVOLVEMENT FROM 1961-PRESENT
The 1960s
After its creation in 1961, DIA struggled through the remaining decade to define 
its role in the intelligence field and consolidate its internal and external management 
duties. As the agency developed, the need for more direct guidance became necessary. 
By September o f 1963, the directive that had created DIA in 1961 had several 
amendatory revisions which broadened the responsibilities o f  the agency. This included 
assuming the duties o f the J-2, Joint Staff in June o f 1963 to include COMINT, ELINT, 
and non-SIGINT fimctions, target intelligence, and support to the JCS and Secretariat on 
intelligence areas. These revisions and changes were part o f  the phased plan to develop 
DIA, gradually integrating the necessary service intelligence fimctions and planned 
growth o f the new agency. This plan was guided by two major objectives. First, the 
organization was to have a horizontal structure avoiding vertical compartments that might 
result in competing levels o f  operation and therefore duplication of effort.^* And, 
secondly, a plan to increase communication between operations elements in the field and 
operational directors at D IA  was to increase the effectiveness o f the overall management 
o f the agency. Guided by these goals, the gradual development of DIA began.
54 Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 55.
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Command Element
DIA’s functions were originally organized into three elements around which the 
directorates and branches o f DIA were developed to fulfill the agency’s missions; the 
Command, Management and Support, and Operations elements. The Command Element 
included those offices that supported headquarters or served as liaisons to headquarters. 
These functions included the Inspector General, providing routine inspections, the 
Special Advisory Group, performing specified studies and advising the command 
element, the Special Security Office, handled special intelligence and sensitive 
information within DIA and lastly the Special Activities Office, which performed 
interagency functions within the intelligence com m unity .T hese offices provided the 
leadership arm o f DIA and were a vital building block of the agency, providing a basis 
for action.
Management And Support Element 
The Management and Support element included five major offices designed to 
provide services for the agency. The Plans and Policy office was established with the 
creation o f the agency in 1961 and in charge o f the “Acth^ation Plan” for DIA as well as 
long range plans and programs for different functions within DIA to include: collection 
plans, scientific and technological plans, counterintelligence plans, maps, charts and 
geodesy product plans, and training plans. In essence this office was responsible for the 
planning o f all DIA programs. The Administrative arm o f this element served the 
command structure in addition to providing personnel support, both military and civilian 
as well as, services, records management, security, and career development within the
55 Ibid., 67.
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Agency. The training role within DIA was indeed important, as much o f the criticism 
o f the intelligence community after W W n was directed toward the lack o f  training fi>r its 
analysts which added to the negative image o f the intelligence career field within the 
services. This negative image was basically a result o f  stunted career opportunities in the 
intelligence field. It was almost unheard o f for a military intelligence officer to attain the 
rank o f general and therefore a career minded officer was wise to avoid the path o f 
intelligence specialization. As a result, a major effort needed to be undertaken to resolve 
this image with an emphasis on career development for intelligence personnel. Out o f 
this requirement the Career Development Group was appointed to study and make 
recommendations on the training and career progression o f  intelligence officers. Under 
the advisement o f this group the Intelligence Career Development Program was instituted 
in 1964 within the DIA organization.^’ Ultimately the goal was to develop a professional 
intelligence corps, which provided continuity through the retainment o f experienced 
civilian analysts despite the rotating nature o f the services within the agency. The 
ençhasis in this concern wasn’t the training but the planning o f career progression in the 
intelligence field, yielding better intelligence officers for the future. This role only stayed 
in the administrative section briefly, as it was transferred to the Plans and Policy section 
in 1964.
In the Administrative branch, one o f the biggest problems feeing the agency in the 
immediate period following its creation was acquiring personnel. Personnel shortages
“  Ibid.. 70.
”  Ibid, 73-74.
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were prevalent in the “functional elements” being transferred over to DIA/* In addition, 
the Services, unhappy about the creation o f DIA to begin with, were slow in providing 
nominees to staff the agency. Obtaining clearances for all the new employees bogged 
down the administrative security branch and in an effort to accomplish the paperwork, 
DIA was forced to hire temporary help within the agency, a first at this time for a federal 
agency.^’ The administrative arm was also responsible for identifying where these new 
recruits would contribute their talents. In other words, a plan for creating appropriate job 
positions, and titles had to be drawn up and implemented amidst this hiring chaos. 
Therefore, it is easy to see that DIA’s period o f establishment in the early 1960’s was not 
a smooth transition, especially in the realm o f staffing the agency.
The production/dissemination and research and development (R&D) section of 
the management element o f DIA was housed in the Intelligence Support System office. 
The purpose o f  this office was dual: consolidate information processed DoD wide as 
well as head the Department o f Defense Research and Development processes. A goal in 
the establishment o f DIA was to automize the processing of data for more effective 
dissemination o f DoD products. Previously, each service had a different program for 
data processing, leading once again to duplication o f effort. These functions too, were 
phased into DIA and in 1966, the agency became the “single manger o f worldwide 
intelligence datahandling systems . .  .”** As fer a the R & D effort, DIA was responsible 
for U.S. domestic research and development as well as monitoring and coordination all R
Ibid.,76. 
”  Ibid.,77.
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& D efforts for the defense department. A short period later, these dramatically different 
functions under the Intelligence Support Systems Branch became separate directorates for 
more coordinated management.
The Comptroller office served as the functional authority for the . .  financial 
management and direction <in> obtaining effective utilization of the DOD intelligence 
resources.”** This included the preparation o f  the DoD intelligence yearly budget, no 
small task for such a new organization. In addition, the comptroller office managed the 
manpower program for DIA. Lastly, the management and support element also included 
the establishment of the Defense Intelligence School in 1962 as a professional 
intelligence education institution. This is where DIA addressed the concerns over the 
continuing education of intelligence personnel, both military and civilian. The rapidly 
changing world situations after WWII demanded an educated corps o f intelligence 
professionals capable of guiding leadership in military and political situations to come 
concerning a myriad of situations. The management and support element o f DIA would 
change over the years; however, the element played a major role in the development of 
the DIA’s manpower and resources.
Operations Element
The third and final original branch o f  DIA was the Operations element containing 
two major offices for collecting and processing intelligence. The Collection Branch was 
to serve as a “single integrated facility” for intelligence collection “in its complete cycle -  
from receipt, throughout the collection process, to a final evaluation o f results obtained in
“ Ibid.,85.
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terms o f  means, timeliness and cost involved.”*’ This involved establishing an overall 
list o f  DoD wide intelligence requirements and priorities as well as a means for 
coordinating collection operations throughout the Defense Department to include 
technical and human intelligence efforts. This was a monumental task as it involved 
meshing the requirement o f all the services as well as the priorities o f the DoD into one 
major plan for collection. Processing o f intelligence was handled by a separate branch o f  
the operations element which held the primary substantive intelligence functions o f  the 
agency. The Processing branch included a production office, estimates office, current 
intelligence office and an indications and warning center — all o f which provided fused 
intelligence back to the services and up the chain to higher headquarters, thereby seeking 
to eliminate the duplication and inaccurateness o f previous years. The production office 
coordinated the services products such as reference files, libraries and processing 
capabilities into centralized offices o f production. As might be expected, the estimate 
element provided national leadership with imputs to National Intelligence Estimates 
(NIE) integrating the service imputs. “The DIA Estimates Office provided a central 
control point for the production o f finished intelligence by “reviewing and coordinating 
as directed, the intelligence estimative functions retained by, or assigned to, the military 
departments.’”*’ This was an area where DIA began to “shine” early in its creation.
NIE’s became more reliable and requested by the national leadership, indicating that at 
least in one area, consolidation o f military intelligence efforts was successful and 
meaningful from the start. To satisfy requirements for current intelligence, DIA
“  Ibid., 90. 
“  Ibid., 100.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
33
established a 24-hour Alert Center in order to provide military services and governmental 
leadership with round the clock, all-source current intelligence, especially in crisis 
situations. This broad mission included an endless number o f tasks which were difficult 
to manage efficiently at first. Eventually, the tasks were organized functionally and 
geogr^hically providing in-depth analysis and support especially during crisis situations, 
such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Further Defining DIA’s Roles 
These three sections served as the primary building blocks around which DIA was 
built from 1961 to 1963. During the period until 1970, DIA struggled for operational 
effectiveness, following its initial establishment. This struggle was fought against a 
background o f growing U.S. involvement in international relations. When the agency 
was created, the biggest foreign policy issue was the Korean War and then shortly before 
its creation, the Bay o f Pigs. Since its creation worldwide events had included the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Vietnam issues, and the emerging nations o f  Africa. Therefore, DIA’s 
organizational structure required changes to accommodate the new intelligence 
requirements. This would become a useful trend in DIA’s organization: restructuring 
after major political or military events in an effort to upgrade military intelligence 
support across the board. In this way, DIA used a “lessons learned” perspective to 
continually develop the young agency, successfully adapting to the changing needs o f the 
intelligence consumers. This is quite apparent in the 1993 reorganization which occurred 
as a result o f intelligence lessons learned from a successful campaign o f Desert Storm. 
Despite this seemly reactive nature o f revision, DIA also took a forwarding looking
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attitude from its inception in its attempts to develop the agency to satisfy the goal of 
better-coordinated military intelligence.
The phased evolution o f the agency was mostly completed by 1964; however,
DIA added some major functions to its organization in that year in order to bring about 
the original intent o f  the 1961 charter. These new elements included: mapping, charting 
and geodesy, counterintelligence, science and technology, dissemination center and the 
defense attaché system In assuming the duties o f Mapping, Charting and Geodesy 
(MC&G), DIA consolidated the separate services products into products appropriate for 
use DoD-wide. In September 1963, DIA created an office o f  Counterintelligence and 
Security giving DIA an internal security check within the agency, a means for monitoring 
the service organizations counterintelligence programs as well as providing support to the 
JCS, Unified and Specific commands. However, the director was specific that the 
external aspects o f counterintelligence, basically, assessing threats to U.S. intelligence 
activities, remain with the individual services.** The great majority o f these types o f 
assessments are made within the individual services specialized units which conduct 
vulnerability assessments to their specific intelligence functions. Additionally, up until 
1962, the separate military departments also maintained their own Science and 
Technological (S&T) functions. S&T had become increasingly important since the end 
of WWn in an era o f quickly advancing weapon systems and with the advent o f the 
atomic age. However, service biases once again led to highly specialized assessments 
and duplication o f effort on the part o f the services. In addition, funding was decreasing 
for this function in the services while the need for technological intelligence was
‘'Ibid., 120.
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increasing. In an effort to rectify these disparate trends, DIA assumed the S&T role in 
1962 -  a role which became increasingly important over the course o f time with the 
ongoing Cold War and arms race with the USSR.
In order to quickly and efficiently disseminate its materials to all o f  its customers, 
DIA formed a Dissemination Center in 1964. This role was one o f the most difficult to 
take over from the services as it involved processing a massive number o f intelligence 
reports from the services and molding them into products useful to all the branches o f the 
military.** The accomplishment o f this function was extremely important from a lessons 
learned prospective. The Korean War had illustrated the travesties o f getting intelligence 
too late. Intelligence is only as good as your means to distribute it to the customers that 
need it. Therefore, DIA's assumption o f  this responsibility was o f critical importance.** 
Lastly, DIA co-managed the defense attaché functions with the services from 
1961-1965. Prior to that, attaches had been controlled by the individual military services 
based on a 1949 DoD Directive that specified the services responsibility for this 
collection function. These programs were operated independently in each service 
brought together only by the Office o f  the Secretary o f  Defense (OSD) who jointly 
approved locations o f attaché posts with the State Department. DIA took over this OSD 
function with its creation in 1961. In 1963, the importance o f attaches gained increasing 
significance due to the type o f intelligence they could provide on the new international 
scene. In addition, once again the independent operation o f this system under the 
services brought about duplication o f  both effort and costs, as well as impeded the
"  Ibid., 125. 
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distribution o f  the intelligence products. DIA was the natural location to consolidate 
these intelligence efforts and in 1963, the Defense Attaché System was created under 
DIA, giving managerial control of the system to D IA In 1965, DIA received full 
authority for the attaché system bringing an element o f HUMINT into DIA’s intelligence 
responsibilities. DIA’s goals were to improve the reporting system and represent all 
interests o f  the military community in this area o f collection. Therefore, DIA appointed 
all attaches on the recommendation o f the services and controlled their post locations and 
duration o f assignment based on the needs of the military intelligence community as a 
whole. This too was an example o f the overall effectiveness o f  the notion under which 
DIA was created -  consolidation o f effort and resources for military intelligence.
1966 Reorganization 
A JCS inspection o f  DIA in 1965 recommended some additional organizational 
changes, however, reorganization would not occur until 1966. Two major goals drove 
the 1966 reorganization: improved “reaction time” o f  those elements which provided 
critical products to the military services, and reduction o f the number of elements that 
reported to the DIA director.*’ This first goal was given priority, as it was a direct 
intelligence function o f the agency. In the formative years o f D IA  integration o f the 
services functions was often just a process o f changing the name and putting the authority 
under the new agency. However, as DIA progressed, real integration needed to occur to 
make intelligence more efficient. This was the case in the Operations element o f DIA 
especially in the production/processing function. As discussed earlier, DIA maintained a 
processing function which provided NIE’s, current intelligence and I&W to its customers
67 Ibid., 138.
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who included: national leadership. Unified and Specified commands and c o n ^ n en t 
commanders. However, due to the varied needs o f these customers, DIA needed to 
effectively adopt a plan in which all o f  their needs could be met effectively. The initial 
organization o f the Processing branch was based mostly on function: providing the 
NIE’s, supporting current intelligence requirements and so on. However, overlap in areas 
occurred frequently and the system became more time-consuming than productive. The 
new concept beginning in 1966 reorganized this branch geographically into four areas: 
Soviet, Eastern, Western and Latin America.** Each area was responsible for all 
functions o f production in its area and was able to prioritized the function most needed at 
the time: current intelligence, I&W, NIE, or basic intelligence, thereby producing more 
timely and responsive intelligence to its varied customers. In addition to this significant 
change, in order to reduce the number o f areas that reported directly to the Command 
element, some o f the major branches in DIA were given additional responsibilities and 
authority to include: reorganizing the Plans and Programs branch, the Collection branch, 
as well as the Command branch. By the end o f the 1960’s, DIA was beginning to 
develop into a capable intelligence agency. However, the increasing role o f the U.S. in 
world politics and decreasing resources would prove difficult for the agency as it 
continued to solidify its role in defense intelligence.
DIA’s Role in Military Operations o f  1960s 
During this period o f early development for DIA the agency faced some major 
intelligence challenges in the fece o f the developing Cold War, new technological 
advances and major political/military events, namely the Cuban Missile Crisis o f 1962,
6S Ibid., 143.
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military action in the Dominican Republic, and growing involvement in Vietnam. 
Requirements arose not only from the need to provide accurate military intelligence to 
decision-makers, but also from taskings to account for American servicemen missing or 
captured in Southeast Asia.^® In October 1962, the agency feced its first intelligence 
crisis in the wake o f  the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the most part, the CIA was the voice 
o f intelligence during this crisis, as DIA had been in existence for just a year and barely 
had the manning much less the experience o f the CIA. DIA did have within its 
Processing branch the Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC) which provided 
for the formation o f a special task force in times o f crisis. Thus, in the fell o f 1962, the 
Cuban Situation Room was established embodying a small, specialized group o f 
intelligence analysts concentrating on producing special products in response to the crisis. 
DIA’s Director as a member o f the USIB participated in the daily meetings o f the board 
during the crisis period.’” Intelligence as a whole redeemed itself during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis after the disaster o f the Bay o f Pigs in 1961. Speculations by DIA analysts 
that the activities in Western Cuba were possibly preparations to install offensive 
equipment led to a request by the DIA director to increase U-2 flights over the island.
The CIA agreed with the request and on 29 September placed Cuba on the collections 
list, making it the number one collection priority less than five days later.’* Imagery 
from the U-2 on 14 October and subsequent imagery revealed what was assessed to be
Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 
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MRBM sites being erected on the island. This “early warning” allowed national 
leadership to make informed decisions during the crisis and eventually gave them enough 
information with which to plan a course o f action leading to the resolution o f the crisis. 
Despite intelligence’s good showing, there were critics regarding the intelligence 
communities NIE prior to the crisis, which assessed that, the Soviets would not put 
offensive weapons on Cuba. This was a result o f  predisposition toward Soviet actions o f  
the past ) ^ c h  proved fellible. “On the balance the intelligence community provided the 
Kennedy administration with enough warning o f the Soviet missile deployment to allow 
it to elaborate an effective response. Had the missiles been discovered sooner, the 
performance might have been brilliant, but as it was intelligence was creditable.”
Congressional Review 
Despite its enormous progress since its creation in 1961, problems still plagued 
the young agency. Internal and external resistance to DIA accomplishing the tasks it was 
assigned was still prevalent and felt deeply by the branches o f the services in the external 
view. The original duties of the agency may have begun to sink in with the services, but 
continual absorption o f their intelligence duties, such as the MC& G and the Attaché 
system in the raid-1960’s gave way to some resistance. This, despite the fact that DIA 
was adamant that the highly tactical elements o f intelligence must stay with the 
individual branches in order to maximize the effectiveness o f the intelligence products. 
Misperceptions o f the role the defense intelligence community played in national 
decisions were also a problem, given the agency was young and just beginning to forge
’^ Ibid., 149.
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its way in intelligence. National leadership was slow to change and slow to realize that 
DIA was the defense intelligence source and another step in the U.S. intelligence 
community. The CIA, although young in its own right, was seen as the primary 
intelligence agency o f the period and even today. This is evident in the lack of 
information on DIA’s role in the intelligence community, compared with the plethora of 
information regarding CIA’s involvement in events over the years. In addition to these 
“growing pains”, DIA was created and formed in a period o f continually decreasing 
resources and increasing demands. It had to do more with less and that was quite 
difficult in the formative years in the fece o f  increasing international responsibility. 
Internal strife within the agency also p iqued  its development at times as well. As a 
result, DIA realized the need to develop an overall intelligence plan to guide the 
agency.’  ^ This was approved by the Secretary o f Defense in February o f  1967.
External criticism o f  the agency and suggestions for change also helped mold the 
agency in this period. The Froehlke Report in July 1969 enq) hasized the lack o f a 
program which allocated intelligence resources against the intelligence requirements of 
the time. In response to this report and in an effort to streamline OSD management o f the 
agency, the Secretary o f Defense, Melvin Laird directed that his office be responsible for 
making sure the agency had a clear direction for intelligence efforts. This effort 
included; conqiarisons and trade-offs o f  national intelligence programs, institution o f a 
Five Year Intelligence Resource Plan, procedures for identifying major issues in 
intelligence resources, and a continual reviewing system In addition, another report in 
July 1969, The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel under the leadership of Gilbert Fitzhugh,
^Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21 Year Organizational History”, 162.
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emphasized that perhaps DIA was too compartmented and that there existed the potential 
for conflict as the agency’s director reported to both the Secretary o f Defense and the 
JCS. In addition, a lack o f fiscal and management control over the services intelligence 
functions made DIA’s mission o f integrating intelligence difficult. The report 
recommended streamlining the reporting chain for DIA and creating a position within the 
OSD for an Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Intelligence who would coordinate all 
DoD intelligence ac tiv ities.A spects o f  these reports gave way to the reorganization of 
the agency again in 1970. Despite the challenges o f  establishing a new agency and 
amidst the crises o f the period, DIA began to solidify its position in the intelligence 
community as an agency capable o f being responsive to a worldwide theater of 
operations.
The 1970s
The 1970’s were turbulent years for DIA as they moved from establishing 
management arms to developing a credible intelligence arm. DIA under underwent three 
major reorganizations during this period, one in 1970, another in 1976, and a third in 
1979. All were attempts to overhaul management o f the organization in order to produce 
better-integrated intelligence, establishing DIA’s role in the national intelligence 
community. The original organization o f DIA was based on the immediate need to 
establish the agency while the reorganization of 1966 addressed the problem o f a more 
responsive intelligence product. The reorganization o f 1970 touched every level o f the 
organization elevating responsibilities and streamlining the organization. External 
criticism within the government indicated that DoD intelligence wasn’t worth the heavy
Ibid., 165-66.
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financial burden it cost to maintain. The Assistant Secretary o f Defense (Administration) 
believed DIA was “poorly managed, and needed improvements in collection, estimating, 
dissemination, and resource allocation.”’  ^ This observation was well as a 1968 report 
from the House Appropriation Committee emphasizing the management inadequacies o f  
the agency, led to DIA Director, Lieutenant General Bennett’s decision to overhaul the 
agency’s organization in January 1970.
DIA’s objectives for this reorganization were based on the need to clarify the 
roles o f the agency as well as improving the performance o f its intelligence mission in the 
face of dwindling resources. This was done by adjusting responsibilities within the 
agency and consolidating like tasks into functional areas. The renovations of 1970 were 
complete by the end o f  the year and included no less than nine major changes. First o f 
all, the Deputy Directorate for Estimates was created from the duties o f the former 
Processing and Secretariat function and was solely responsible for all military 
intelligence estimates. The mission o f the new directorate was to develop, coordinate and 
produce NIE’s and SNIE’s to support the Secretary o f Defense, JCS, and the NSC, as 
well as estimate foreign military capabilities for the purpose of long range planning. As 
a result o f a committee appointed by General Bennett to study all aspects of the Defense 
Attaché System, this function too was elevated to a Deputy Director position for Attaché 
Affairs and was led by a general/flag officer who reported directly to the DIA director. It 
became to focal point for all coordination and direction for attaché affairs within DIA and 
DoD. In the realm o f  collections, added requirements over the past few years dictated a 
need for a consolidated collection effort within the agency as well as an element of 
increased collection responsiveness in times of crisis. In July 1970. the Current
Ibid., 167.
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Collection Center was established at the Pentagon and handled collection requirements 
requiring immediate action. Additionally, the Directorate fo r  Collection and 
Surveillance was created and consolidated all DIA collection under one umbrella (except 
for attaché collection managed under the new Attaché system.) The new directorate was 
responsible for; the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), the DIA 
Representative Group (DIARP) a liaison to NSA, the photo lab, previously in another 
division, and SIGINT and special Sensors, HUMINT collection, as well as processing 
this information. “It processed, validated, assigned priorities, and levied intelligence 
collection requirements on all Defense collection activities.”’” Production activities for 
DIA’s multiple functions were consolidated under the Deputy Directorate for  
Intelligence. This was an area o f constant change, as U.S. national security interests grew 
and shifted. These changing interests and customer requirements required flexibility.
The new directorate was responsible for all-source finished general military intelligence, 
developing target systems, physical vulnerability research and bomb damage assessments 
(BDA), and in-depth assessments o f military operations around the world. This included 
current intelligence and indications and warning support to the OSD and JCS, previously 
found in the Processing structure of the original DIA system. The new organization 
included a myriad o f divisions which were divided operationally as well as 
geographically to cover the many aspects o f intelligence research and analysis. The 
Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology was formed to allow increased attention 
to this area o f intelligence. This directorate conducted research on foreign developments 
in air, missile, naval, space and ground system developments, reporting those
"‘ Ibid., 185.
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technological advances significant enough to drive changes in NIE’s or national strategy. 
This concluded the operational changes in DIA under the 1970 reorganization, however 
functional areas o f  DIA also required change in an effort to increase the responsiveness 
and capabilities o f  the agency.
The planning function grew into the Deputy Directorate for Plans where it 
continued its role in intelligence planning. However, new operational elements were 
added to the directorate giving it responsibility for MC&G, data processing, as well as 
some research and development tasks. The responsibility for SIGINT functions, as well 
as training responsibilities o f the plans section were deleted and given to the new 
Directorate for Collection and Surveillance and Directorate o f Support, respectively.
The new Deputy Directorate for Support consolidated numerous functions previously 
strung-out among numerous DIA branches including; personnel and career management, 
administrative services, communications, central reference, counterintelligence and 
security and the Defense Intelligence School. The last major area o f renovation was in 
the comptroller function which added increased responsibilities in planning for budgetary 
requirements which funded the agencies programs. In addition, the comptroller became 
responsible for managing DIA’s manpower and advising the Director and the JCS on 
manpower issues.
Other changes that affected the agency in this early period o f the 1970’s included 
the creation o f the Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Intelligence as a liaison between the 
DCI, CIA and other intelligence agencies.”  As articulated by the Froehlke report in the 
late 1960’s, DoD needed a central focal point for addressing intelligence issues within the
Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 9.
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Office o f the Secretary o f  Defense, mainly to manage resource allocation issues among 
DIA, the service components and the unified and specified commands. Until this 
position was created, DIA had to rely on compromises between the players in the 
ongoing competition for resources. Another report in 1971 by James R. Schlesinger 
agreed with the recommendations o f  Froehlke and recommended to President Nixon the 
formation o f an intelligence liaison position in the OSD. The position was created via a 
DoD Directive and held the new secretary responsible for the management o f intelligence 
resources, programs and activities.’* President Nixon also sought to improve intelligence 
management as a whole in this period, emphasizing the need for “clear lines o f  authority 
and responsibility. . . ” within the intelligence community.”  In the midst o f  this 
redefining o f the intelligence role, three new agencies were created which took some 
responsibilities out o f the hands o f DIA: the Defense Investigation Service (DIS), the 
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and the National Cryptologic Command. They 
eliminated the MC&G functions o f DIA totally, and downsized the agency in the 
counterintelligence area and SIGINT responsibilities.
The 1970 reorganization, and subsequent events were, on the whole successful 
based on the intent to streamline the organization. However, this new arrangement 
obscured the traditional three segments o f command, management and operations within 
DIA. In addition, the new organization put all the offices on a horizontal level where 
they competed equally for resources and visibility, going against one o f the original 
objectives for creating the agency. In addition, some of the ills o f DIA could not be fixed
Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 203- 
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by reorganization; manpower reductions plagued the agency throughout the 1970’s. 
Budgetary issues between 1968-1975 decreased the %ency’s manpower by thirty one 
percent prompting mission reductions and organizational restructuring once again.
1972-75 Organizational Changes 
The most significant changes over the next five years occurred at the command 
level o f  the %ency. The functions o f the Secretariat, the JCS support division (which 
became the J-2 Support Division in 1974), and the Directorate for Plans were all 
subordinated under the Chief o f  Staff o f  the DIA. The J-2 function moved to show 
increased significance of the role o f DIA to the JCS and the Plans Directorate was 
significantly reorganized after losing several o f its missions with the creation o f DMA 
and DIS. Additionally, in 1974, the agency further expanded its support to the JCS and 
established Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO’s) to advise DIA’s senior staff on 
substantive intelligence issues.*” In addition these officers interfaced with the CIA 
National Intelligence Officers and promoted DIA products, increasing timeliness and 
quality o f intelligence on the national scene. As for the rest of the agency during this 
period, numerous minor functional changes occurred, mostly elevating branch tasks to 
the directorate level. The three most important changes in this area included: elevating 
training to the Deputy Directorate for Personnel, Development and Training, establishing 
the Deputy Directorate for Information Sy^/eAns,(removing it from the Directorate for 
Support) in an effort to provide a better defense automated data processing system, and 
establishing the Defense Intelligence School as a separate directorate. Organizational
80 Ibid., 11.
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refinement for the Attaché, Collection, and Production Directorates resulted from a 
combination o f decreasing resources and increasing worldwide responsibilities. In 1975, 
a major overhaul in the production arena occurred and the Deputy Directorate was 
elevated to a full directorate, stressing the emphasis the Agency placed on production and 
the “desire to gain acceptance for its products at the national level.. .”** Despite 
financial bureaucratic obstacles during this period, DIA’s reputation grew as it became 
recognized that its products were valuable in the decision making process.
1976 Reorganization Period 
While DIA was building up its intelligence credibility, a combination of financial 
and bureaucratic factors forced the agency to modify its internal structure once again in 
1976. The financial factors, previously discussed, continually cut manpower in the 
agency. An intense Congressional review in 1975-1976 once again brought charges o f 
abuse across the intelligence field leading to an Executive Order which modified some 
functions o f the intelligence community. As a result, DIA streamlined all o f  its 
production activities. The realignment included the creation o f three new positions at the 
DoD level: the establishment o f the DoD Inspector General, the redesignation of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense on Intelligence as the Director o f  Defense Intelligence, 
giving him expanded control o f  not only DIA, but also NSA, and the creation of the 
Defense Intelligence Board, designed as a forum between intelligence producers and 
users. President Nixon also abolished the USIB and created the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB). Most important for the overall intelligence 
community at this time was the establishment o f the Intelligence Oversight Board within
*' Ibid., 238.
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the FIAB in charge o f ensuring that intelligence agencies didn’t overstep their 
boundaries.
At the organizational level o f DIA, reform was focused around two themes: 
excellence and broad support.*^ Within the Command Element, the Deputy Director was 
renamed the Vice-Director o f  Plans, Operations and Support and tasked to manage seven 
major directorates: J-2, Systems planning. Plans and Policy, Collection, Attaches, the 
school, and a new directorate, the Resources and Support/Comptroller. The Chief o f  
Staff position was replaced with the Coordination Staff responsible for all agency staff 
functions. The General Counsel, Inspector General, and Scientific Advisory Board 
reported directly to the agency director, however the DIO program now reported to the 
Vice instead of directly to the agency’s top man. Two new positions were created, 
reporting to the director: the Director’s Staff Group supported the Secretary of Defense 
and advisors on policy forming and the Senior Intelligence Advisor. These two positions 
rounded out the new leadership o f  DIA designed to provide better control o f the agency 
in regards to responsiveness, accountability, and support to its customers.
Under the new organization, the Plans and Policy, Collection, and Attaché 
directorates received name changes and a few minor organizational changes. The 
Support directorate was redesignated the Directorate for Resources and 
Support/Comptroller and included support functions, comptroller duties, information 
systems function, personnel, career development and training functions organized into six 
deputy directorates and an administrative arm. The Vice Director for Production 
incorporated the estimates and S&T directorates as well as the DIO which formerly
12Ibid., 248.
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reported to the Director himself. A Current Intelligence division was created which 
encompassed the National Military Intelligence Center designed to provide integrated 
intelligence to decisionmakers in times o f crisis. Later that year NMIC was revamped to 
centralize control o f  indications and warning functions, production and dissemination 
activities and the 24 hour Alert Center.*^ All o f  these changes were once again an effort 
to streamline intelligence activities in the DoD, making it more responsive. The 
pendulum swung from centralized to decentralized management o f the agency.
In 1977, the charter that created DIA was revised for the first time clarifying the 
relationship with the JCS and the Secretary o f Defense. It established a modified 
reporting chain for DIA to report directly to the Secretary o f Defense through the 
Director o f  Defense Intelligence, with the Director continuing to report through the JCS 
and remaining under their operational control. In addition the charter included the NMIC 
function o f DIA, institutionalizing its functions in the DIA charter. “O f the greatest 
significance was that the charter recognized DIA as the primary intelligence authority in 
military inputs to national level products.”*^  DIA had finally achieved national 
recognition and credit for its function, basically solidifying its position within the 
intelligence community after 16 years o f establishment.
Also in 1977, upon the advice o f a Task Force formed to look at the over all 
design o f defense intelligence, two more Assistant Secretary o f Defense positions were 
created: one to manage the resources o f the agency and the other to manage policy
"  Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 262. 
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matters.*^ Between 1977-1978, there were minor changes to the directorates established 
in the 1976 Reorganization, but not until 1979 did substantive change come again, 
changes that would finally settle the agency into a period of stability. In 1979, Executive 
Order 12036 completely restructured the Intelligence community better defining DIA’s 
national and departmental responsibilities. “The agency was reorganized around five 
major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support.”*”
1979 Reorganization 
The goals o f  this reorganization were to strengthen management o f the agency 
and simplify its organization, better manage resources, increase support to the JCS, and 
improve external intelligence coordination. The former Vice Directorate for Plans, 
Operations and Support was redesignated the Vice Directorate for Management and 
Operations responsible for production management, collection management, and attaches 
and training. This put all intelligence operations into one directorate for the first time.
The Vice Director for Production was renamed the Director for Foreign Intelligence and 
was assigned a civilian as the head. All o f  the production functions o f intelligence were 
incorporated here to include estimates, intelligence research, and S&T. However, the 
current intelligence function, normally associated with production was moved to the JCS 
Support Directorate during this period where it remained indefinitely. The Assistant 
Directorate fo r  Resources and Systems was established and reported directly to the 
Command element o f DIA in an attempt to streamline all resource allocations for the 
agency. Included in this directorate were the downgraded offices o f Comptroller,
“  Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Communitv. 44.
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Communications, Security Services and Personnel. The support functions o f this 
directorate included administrative, reference, photographic, imagery, and support as well 
as publication branches. Additionally, DIA’s automated information handling systems 
were subordinated in this directorate, giving full control o f resources to its director. In an 
effort to satisfy the JCS more effectively, the Assistant Directorate for JCS Support was 
created and encompassed current intelligence, strategic warning systems, and a J-2 
support office. This new directorate also reported directly to the Command element. 
Finally, the position o f Deputy Director for Defense Intelligence was created to 
coordinate DIA’s relationship with external agencies and entities important in its mission. 
These offices started with the Executive Office o f  the President and ran all the way down 
to cooperation with foreign military attaches.*’ This position was organized into a 
directorate and further incorporated the plans and policy functions o f DIA. This final 
reorganization o f the 1970’s prepared DIA for the new decade. Its organization was 
simple and further solidified the agency’s position in the intelligence community.
Support to Military Action in the 1970s 
Despite efforts to improve national intelligence during this decade, budgetary 
constraints and limited resources restricted intelligence collection and the ability to 
produce timely intelligence. This, at a  time when the international “field of play” was 
expanding. The 1970’s saw the emergence o f the Palestine Liberation Organization, the 
development o f arms control and détente with China, and increasing independence 
movements around the world all o f  which created new areas for intelligence collection. 
Toward the end o f  the decade, analysts were focused in the Middle East with the Iranian
87 Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency; A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 292.
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overthrow o f  the Shah of Iran and the taking o f  U.S. hostages in Tehran. The rapidly 
changing world environment combined with the lack o f  resources during this period 
ultimately made for increasing intelligence shortcomings.
Intelligence’s role in Vietnam began to develop in the mid to late 1960’s and 
continued into the 1970’s. Vietnam had a significant impact on the intelligence 
community as a whole. “For DIA, the heavy processing burden detracted from efforts to 
improve the organization’s management efficiency.”** From the beginning, even before 
the creation o f DIA, NIE’s by the CIA had predicted that military action in Vietnam 
would be attainable. However, the new national goal o f  the United States was to fight 
Communism in the worldwide arena, and so, in hindsight, the U.S. emerged into a losing 
battle for democracy. DIA set up the Southeast Asia Task Force in February o f 1964 just 
as it had done during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to provide detailed support to the national 
leadership and commanders in the conduct o f  the Vietnam conflict. Even as President 
Johnson threatened the bombing o f industry in North Vietnam in 1964 in an effort to halt 
Hanoi’s support o f  the Vietcong, the intelligence community advised that the majority of 
the support to the Vietcong was indigenous within South Vietnam and that the policy 
would not be productive. Despite this assessment, the politicians o f the day were 
convinced that the threats and the bombings would reverse the tide o f support to the 
Vietcong. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former CIA officer assessed that, “In effect, this was to 
remain the key difference between the intelligence community and the policy makers: 
the former skeptical about bombing breaking the will o f  the North; the latter convinced h
** Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency; A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 161.
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would force concessions.” *’ This was the position o f both the CIA and DIA at the time.
A DIA estimate in 1965 as to the effects o f  the bombings in the north indicated that the
current military actions were having little if no affect on North Vietnam.
The idea that destroying, or threatening to destroy, NorthVietnam’s industry 
would pressure Hanoi into calling it quits, seems, in retrospect, a colossal 
misjudgment.’®
The CIA agreed with this estimate and confirmed it in replies to the Secretary o f Defense. 
These estimates changed little over the years in which conflict continued in Vietnam. The 
intelligence estimates o f the individual services usually held the opposite view. This 
enq)hasized a significant problem in the overall picture o f the roles and responsibilities of 
DIA which were later identified. The major failure o f intelligence in Vietnam was not 
necessarily the estimates, but the feet that intelligence and policy-makers never sat down 
together to hash out a plan of action based on U.S. interests and goals in the area based on 
intelligence estimates. Internally, DIA played a major role in producing military 
estimates during Vietnam, however, the effectiveness o f  these products was reduced 
mainly due to a problem in dissemination and its timeliness. Although the agency 
produced massive amounts o f information that might have been helpful to the war-fighter 
as well as the decision-makers, the majority o f this information was haphazardly 
disseminated reducing its usefulness. This was a significant problem which was resolved 
nearly thirty years later leading to the intelligence successes o f Desert Storm.
Congressional Review 
The reorganization of the intelligence community as a \\feole in 1976 was a direct
Kirkpatrick, 101. 
’“ Ibid, 104.
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result o f  the investigations o f  the House and Senate committee’s review o f  intelligence 
during the period following the end o f Vietnam in 1975. Both committees identified the 
strengths, o f  which there were few it seemed and the weaknesses o f  the intelligence 
community, identifying the need for congressional oversight o f intelligence activities. 
With respect to DIA, the House Select Committee on Intelligence under the chairmanship 
o f Representative Pike recommended that DIA be abolished and the responsibilities of 
the agency be transferred to the Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Intelligence and to the 
CIA.”* This, the committee thought was a result o f  the feilure o f the agency to coordinate 
military intelligence adequately.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under Senator Church took an in- 
depth look at the deficiencies and problems in the agency and recommended improving 
oversight o f  intelligence in general in order to better guide the nations intelligence arms. 
According to the Church Committee, DIA’s problem was one o f “too many jobs and too 
many masters.””^  In examining the structure o f DIA, the committee noted DIA was 
heavily loaded down with management problems due to its attempts to meet massive 
intelligence requirements. DIA had a charter to provide a level o f  strategic intelligence to 
the Secretary and JCS as well as tactical intelligence to the services. It had yet to 
effectively organize its missions and to effectively meet the needs o f  the services, 
resulting in smaller intelligence efforts at the services level. They did note, however, that 
DIA had provided the Secretary with improved military intelligence than the individual 
services had provided in the past. In addition, the requirement to provide the Secretary of
” Bain, Tyrus G. ed. The Intelligence Communitv: Historv. Orpanization and Issues. 
(New York: R.R. Bowker Company, 1977), p. 608.
92 Bain, 138.
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Defense military intelligence was often overlooked by the Secretary’s. Many o f the 
Secretaries had looked elsewhere for strategic intelligence guidance because historically, 
CIA was the “primary producer o f national intelligence”, while the majority of 
intelligence needed by the military was tactical at the services level and the JCS level.”^
In addition, DIA did not produce the quality intelligence products nor did it eliminate the 
duplication o f information for which it was designed.
The reasons behind these deficiencies were two fold according to the committee: 
problems o f manpower and budget control. The manpower o f  DIA, provided by the 
services and civilian sectors had ingrained problems which resulted in often poor 
motivation to produce quality intelligence. Additionally, the inability o f DIA to control 
the budget for the military intelligence activities, resulted in the services, using 
intelligence ftmds for other purposes. In conclusion the committee recommended that the 
position o f the agency Director be strengthened to fulfill the needs o f the agency, or 
choice number two, disband the agency. The Church Committee report helped to 
identify the direction o f the agency reforms in the 1976 Reorganization.
The 1980s
During the 1980’s, unlike the previous decade, world events strengthened DIA’s 
mission molding it with each challenge. This period marked an increase in defense 
spending as President Reagan began a significant build-up o f American forces giving 
DIA the funds it had needed to begin development o f the Defense Intelligence Analysis 
Center (DIAC) which would better consolidate DIA operations. From its creation in
”  Ibid.
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1961 until the conq)letion o f the DIAC in 1984, DIA was “housed” in four separate 
buildings which contributed to some early problems in consolidation. After relocating to 
its new fecility at Bolling AFB in 1984, DIA vacated the previous fecilhies except for the 
Command Element, NMIC, and Current Intelligence which remained located in the 
Pentagon to facilitate direct support to the Secretary o f Defense, and the CJCS.”^  The 
DIAC marked a new era for the agency and was a monument to all that the agency had 
achieved over the past 23 years. Amidst undergoing three major reorganizations, 
resource constraints, and attempts to dissolve the agency, DIA had emerged as a credible 
arm o f the U.S. intelligence community.
By the early 1980’s DIA had finally dispelled the negativeness associated with a 
career in intelligence and received the authority to establish a Senior Executive Service 
(SES), enabling the agency to recruit and promote highly experienced civilian personnel. 
On the military side o f the house, general and flag officer billets were expanded and the 
Defense Intelligence College was growing tremendously and earning a distinguished 
reputation. Studies during this period comparing the quality o f intelligence fi’om both the 
CIA and DIA reinforced the credibility o f DIA as a producer of national estimates.”^  The 
publishing in 1981 o f the first unclassified “white papers” titled Soviet Militarv Power, 
which discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet military power was so well 
received that a series of papers were written on the subject, all o f  which were met with 
“wide acclaim.”””
Allen, Deane. “The Building”. (Washington D.C., Defense Intelligence Agency, 
1983).
”  Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 305. 
^ Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 14.
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In the 1980’s DIA concentrated on reforming its missions to better provide critical 
intelligence to tactical and theater commanders. This included a role for intelligence 
support to the newly created Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).
The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) began under the Carter Administration in 
1979, driven by the U.S. national interest in the Persian Gulf area and a strong desire to 
preserve uninterrupted access to oil in the region. Establishment o f the RDF revolved 
around three distinct initiatives: strategic mobility, organizational initiatives, and 
diplomatic undertakings.”’ First, the U.S. needed to be able to deploy forces faster to the 
Persian Gulf, which translated into a much-expanded initiative in air and sealift 
capabilities. This was based on the concept that a small portion o f the RDF would be 
based in the Gulf area, while the reinforcement troops were retained in the U.S. The 
second objective was accomplished with the establishment o f  the Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force in March o f 1980. This new command included Air Force, Army, and 
Marine Corps units to form its foundation. Total manpower with all combined units was 
approximately 200,000 with another 100,000 reserve forces designated for additional 
support. Lastly, with the mission and the manpower, the U.S. sought limited access to 
land-based military bases in the Gulf region for RDF operations. With this, the RDF 
began to operate as a distinct function of the U.S. military community.
The RDF included Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force elements capable of 
short notice deployments supporting remote contingencies to protect U.S. interest 
worldwide. Out o f this new role for DIA came a concerted effort to refine the indications
”  Record, Jeffery. The Rapid Deplovment Force. (Washington D C.: Corporate Press, 
1981), p. 43.
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and warning system in order to better monitor the expanding “hotspots” around the world 
giving the military intelligence community a “quick look” at situations around the 
globe.”* The concept o f  intelligence as a “force multiplier” continued to strengthen 
DIA’s credibility in the early 1980’s.”” Intelligence acting as a “force multiplier,” 
provided accurate and timely intelligence to leadership and commanders allowing them 
to make informed decisions concerning war/crisis management. DIA was capable o f 
providing this specific information, not only to national leadership, but also more in more 
precise terms to commanders because o f  its streamlined, integrated structure. This focus 
on being a “force multiplier” to the unified and specified commanders also created a need 
for dedicated crisis support teams, from which grew the Operational Intelligence Crisis 
Center (OICC) in 1987, tasked to provide analytical support during worldwide crisis 
situations. This center was designed to stand up quickly and translate analytical 
information into operationally relevant products in support o f  on ongoing crisis. The 
OICC was an important player in Desert Storm along with the National Military 
Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) also initiated in 1987. The NMIST unlike the 
OICC, which disseminated information from a central DIA location, were designed to 
augment intelligence support to commanders in crisis operations. Designed to be mobile 
support teams, they deployed with commands to provide analytical support and rapid 
dissemination of extremely time-sensitive intelligence p r o d u c t s . T h e  NMIST concept
** Ibid. 
”  Ibid.
too Ibid.
Shellum, Brian. A Chronologv o f Defense Intelligence in the Gulf War: A Research 
Aid for Analvsis. (Washington D C., DIA History Office, 1997), p. 2.
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proved itself in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and continues to be a crisis support element 
o f  DIA today. In addition to these new dedicated conqxinents o f  intelligence, DIA also 
improved its communications structure in order to disseminate the critical tactical 
intelligence to commanders during contingency situations. The culmination o f all o f  
these efforts was DIA’s designation as a “Combat Support Agency” in 1986 under the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. As a result o f this designation, DIA 
further expanded its responsibilities to U.S. Commands and began to develop joint 
military doctrine.
The theme in the 1980’s involved DIA focusing it missions, organization and 
support to military commands/commanders as well as to the JCS, involving the 
production o f both strategic and tactical intelligence. As regional concerns mounted 
around the world, DIA was positioning itself to provide military intelligence to its most 
important customers.
Support to Military Action in the 1980s
The 1980’s saw an explosion o f world-wide crises ranging from military 
intervention to terrorist activity and including: the downing o f two Libyan SU-22’s by 
U.S. F-14’s, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the Iran-Iraq War, Soviet shoot-down o f the 
Korean Air Lines Flight 007, as well as the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, 
high-jackings o f TWA Flight 847 and of the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO. As a result 
o f the rapidly changing national security environment, DIA applied additional resources 
to monitoring terrorist activities and groups, illegal arms sales and even drug trafficking 
and began to concentrate on low-intensity conflict planning to include warfighting
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capabilities and sustainability issues.*”^  DIA’s roles in intelligence were expanding with 
each militarily significant event.
In supporting the U.S. invasion o f Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in 
1983, a special task force was organized and provided briefings, papers, and general 
intelligence information to field commanders during the operation. DIA’s reorganization 
in 1979 and the ongoing efforts to improve support to tactical commanders, greatly 
contributed to the agencies capability to respond to planning and theater requirements 
during Operation URGENT FURY, speeding up the process o f dissemination to the end 
users. The planning and execution for the operation was done very quickly in efforts to 
protect American citizens in the country which was in danger o f  succumbing to 
Communism. Surprise was key and therefore required precise intelligence on the small 
country: the Cuban presence on the island, estimates on Soviet involvement, strengths 
and weaknesses on the reigning army presence, and the precise location of the students to 
be rescued. However, this intelligence was for the most part unavailable to the planners 
and commanders despite the fact the small island had come under a Marxist regime four 
years previously neither the CIA nor DIA had decent maps, recent imagery, or a good 
estimate o f troop capabilities on Grenada. DIA assessed there could be significant 
military reaction to the U.S. invasion while others implied that minimum resistance was 
likely. Although the invasion was ultimately highly successfiil, it likely was the element 
of luck instead o f intelligence that produced this result. Despite the obvious intelligence 
shortfells, for the most part, no major revisions in the intelligence community occurred in 
this period as a result o f  the intelligence shortfalls during Grenada.
102 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 15.
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As a result o f  its concerted and effective intelligence capabilities during the first 
half o f  the decade, DIA received its first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for 
outstanding intelligence support over the years. This was a direct result o f  the 
outstanding military intelligence support and coordination during international crisis 
situations. The fell o f  the Soviet Union in 1989 also presented DIA with a new challenge 
to start the new decade. The Cold War was officially over and once again the defense 
budget took a hit decreasing funds for DIA’s ever expanding responsibilities in the post 
Cold War world. This new world order produced not one strategic enemy, but in its place 
endless tactical enemies around the globe and the U.S. was drawn into conflicts from S. 
America to the Middle East. No one could have predicted that the end o f the Cold War 
would place the U.S. in the largest milhaiy action since Vietnam: Desert Storm.
Congressional Review 
The Goldwater Nichols Act o f 1986 had the most widespread impact on the 
National Defense structure since the National Security Act o f 1947. This reform act grew 
out o f the intelligence gaps o f the 1980’s and the need for a more streamlined national 
security structure. For the most part, the act strengthened the Joint Chiefs o f Staff 
designating the office as the primary military advisor to the President, Secretary o f 
Defense and the National Security Council and giving the JCS the primary responsibility 
for strategic planning. Previously this authority had been divided among the military 
departments. Further, the growing trend toward joint operations on the battlefield, as 
seen in creation o f the RDF in 1979, as well as joint operations in Grenada and Panama, 
led to an increased emphasis on the role o f joint doctrine, training and exercises also 
encompassed in this legislation.
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For DIA, the impact o f  the Goldwater-Nichols Act was quite significant. 
Designated a Combat Support Agency in this act, DIA began to shift its focus to the 
needs o f the joint war-fighter. This was reflected in the structural changes o f  this period 
in the 1980’s and early 1990’s with the creation o f deployable intelligence support units 
like the NMIST’s as well as the OICC. The top priority o f the agency became providing 
the best intelligence in support o f  operational needs o f the military forces and 
commanders, a significant shift from the purely policymaker support aspect o f  DIA’s 
mission. DIA’s function o f support to the Joint Staffi embodied in DIA’s J-2 was also 
strengthened by this Act. The J-2 assumed a wider role in developing intelligence 
doctrine and policy with the renewed focus o f  ensuring quality intelligence support to 
CINC’s. In addition, DIA assumed the role o f  reporting annually to the Secretary on 
defense intelligence capabilities and recommending a course o f action to plan for future 
requirements. The changes as a result o f the Goldwater Nichols Act o f 1986 were 
significant for DIA in that they reflected the acknowledgement o f a credible role that DIA 
played in the intelligence community.
The 1990s
The end o f the Cold War with the fall o f  communism in Russia started a new 
phase in history for the intelligence community. No longer was there one main area of 
focus, but now unlimited areas for regional conflict. DIA proved its capabilities in the 
first major conflict since its creation - Operation Desert Storm. DIA’s intelligence 
activities in Desert Storm demonstrated the agency’s capabilities and strengthened its 
credibility.
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DIA’s Contribution to Desert Storm 
DIA’s contributions to unprecedented intelligence performance in Desert Storm 
started in the late 1980’s. DIA began monitoring the Iraqi situation soon alter the end of 
the Iran/Iraq War and in the aftermath o f the fall o f the Soviet Union. In the late 1989. 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) predicted that Iraq would become the next major 
regional force in the Middle East. Although DIA believed Iraq would not attack or invade 
based on their motivation to preserve their international integrity, the agency did begin to 
develop Iraq/Kuwait scenarios for CENTCOM exercises. Despite these initial 
convictions, in 1990, DIA began to produce capabilities studies on Iraqi doctrine and 
tactics and in late April, Iraq was added to DIA’s l&W list and assessed as a n ^ e a  for 
potential conflict (WATCHCONIV). In July o f that year, the first unofficial indications 
of Iraqi troop movements South began to appear and DIA stepped up its production and 
imagery collection in support of CENTCOM requirements. The OICC created in 1987 
began providing targeting support for CENTCOM. The OICC had a significant role in 
DIA’s capabilities to produce useable intelligence over the next year and a half. The 
WATCHCON level changed to level HI in late July with additional troop movements and 
equipment deployments, indicating an increased threat in Iraq. On July 22, DIA stood up 
the Iraq/Kuwait Working Group (IZKUWG) in order to provide the additional manpower 
needed to cover new requirements in the face o f the developing crisis. On July 25, 
1990, DIA assessed that Iraq had amassed enough forces to invade Kuwait and take the 
city within 48 hours and the country within five days; the WATCHON level changed to 
n, indicating a significant threat in the area. The tension appeared to lessen over the next
103 Shellum, 6.
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few days, however, when OPEC talks to stabilize the region foiled, DIA raised the 
WATCHCON one last time to I indicating a clear and immediate threat in the area. 
Further, the I23CUWG was expanded into a regional Iraqi Intelligence Task Force (ITF) 
and on the second o f August, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the wake o f the escalating crisis, 
DIA expanded OICC operations to begin target development packages. In addition, DIA 
was part o f the J-5 team that drafted the proposal for action to the Secretary of Defense 
which included a set o f  clear goals for the U.S. These goals were translated into a set of 
comprehensive objectives heeded by the President which guided the conduct o f the 
ensuing conflict.**^ DIA had already dedicated intelligence forces to study the situation, 
advise national leadership, and support unified and specified commands before Desert 
Shield even started. The new elements of its organization created at the end of the 1980’s 
in response to a widening field of play were about to be tested in the largest U.S. 
operation in nearly 20 years.
DIA’s support to military operations and national leadership over the course of 
Desert Storm and Desert Shield was broadly based and included; ITF support which 
oversaw the OICC activities, NMIST deployments, the creation o f the DoDJIC, as well as 
managing collection requirements, publication and dissemination of wartime products 
and specialized study groups on biological and chemical warfare capabilities of Iraq. All 
o f these elements provided DIA with the necessary tools to put together the most 
comprehensive intelligence picture ever presented and greatly contributed to the overall 
outcome o f the war.
The test o f the newly created OICC began with its support in July of 1990 in
Ibid., 12.
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response to JCS requests to initiate the development o f a target list to support 
CENTCOMs increasing responsibilities in the area. Under the direction o f the ITF, the 
OICC coordinated a myriad o f  intelligence during the war to include developing current 
Orders o f Battle which provided up to date assessments o f Iraqi troop, naval and air 
strength. The Center was expanded to a 24 hour manning on notification o f the Iraqi 
invasion and soon after began to produce Military Situation Summaries (MSS) and 
created Operational Support Packages for CENTCOM deployments to the area o f 
operations (AOR). By the end o f August, the OICC also included coalition support and 
MSIC analysts dedicated to assessing Iraqi Air Defense capabilities and their threat to 
coalition forces. The OICC gave commanders initial capabilities assessments 
supplementing existing documents and provided the planners with a first look at the 
situation. Over the course o f  the next year and a half, the ITF received over 5, 212 
taskings o f which the OICC responded to over 3,822 o f these, or 73% indicating the 
importance of the OICC in the crisis situation.
The reaching arm o f  the OICC were the National Military Intelligence Support 
Teams who deployed with the commands to supply time-critical intelligence in the field. 
CENTCOM notified DIA two days after the invasion to have NMIST ready to deploy 
with the initial troops; these included CENTAF personnel deploying to Riyadh on August 
seventh. Over the course o f the next six months eight NMIST deployed to support not 
only all major U.S. Commands (CENTCOM, Special Operations Central Command, 
Army Central Command, Marine Central Command and Navy Central Command) but 
also the United Kingdom Strike Command in England. In addition, NMIST were sent to
Ibid., 39.
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provide critical intelligence to specific Army, Navy and Marine Corps units in the course 
o f the following conflict. For the most part, these deployments were highly successful, 
providing tactical, time-critical intelligence to the deployed Command structures, 
allowing for quick, decisive decisions. DIA retained this function after Desert Storm 
because o f its success, redesignating them the National Intelligence Support Teams 
(NISTs) and incorporating CIA and NSA members to provide a better overall assessment. 
This element o f DIA proved it worth in Desert Storm and exists today as a piece o f a 
more complete puzzle in the realm o f intelligence crisis support.
The last major piece of DIA’s intelligence puzzle was the Department o f Defense 
Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) created at the request o f  the CJCS and located at the 
Pentagon. The purpose o f this element was to ensure coordination o f the services and 
DIA’s intelligence capabilities. All four services along with DIA provided the manning 
for the DoDJIC which initially produced daily situation summaries and assessments, 
along with short suspense analysis to support national decision-makers. However its 
tasks were expanded as needed and included taking over the MSS fi’om the OICC, 
establishing a 24 hour I&W center to watch Iraqi indicators and assess course o f action, 
and imagery analysis. Additionally the DoDJIC produced special assessments on high 
priority subjects such as the location and monitoring o f Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
(SRBM) and SCUD sites in Iraq. The JIC also contained a Central Task Cell to 
coordinate and deconflict intelligence activities with the ITF. At the end of November 
1990, CENTCOM established a forward JIC in Riyadh to which DIA sent over 100 
personnel in support of theater operations. Over the course o f Desert Storm, the DoDJIC
106 Ibid.
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and the forward JIC produced Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) and l&W reports on a 
daily basis providing commanders and national leaders with the information on the 
course o f the conflict as well as assessments o f Iraq’s dwindling capabilities toward the 
end o f the war. The JIC was so successful, that DIA retained many of its functions after 
the war in the Pentagon to support the Joint Staff.
DIA also supported the overall intelligence effort in a collection role and in 
providing special studies to the command structure concerning biological and chemical 
weapons capabilities of the Iraqi’s. In late July 1990, DIA took over fi-om CIA the task 
o f coordinating all collection requirement taskings for CENTCOM, with CENTCOMs 
collection requirements taking precedent over any others. This was the first time the 
Soviet Union was in a secondary role in the collection world. Designated the 
Executive Agency for imagery support by the DoD, DIA also provided imagery ranging 
from target products to collection on SCUD sites and including an “imagery blitz” in 
early October 1990 to obtain the information required to produce a reliable ground order 
o f battle.*®’ However, despite DIA’s efforts, the lack o f collection coordination among 
all agencies was one of the major downfolls of intelligence as a whole in the course of 
Desert Storm. On the other band, DIA combined with CIA analysts to provide an overall 
picture o f Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Groups met to discuss the
107 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 21.
Congress, U.S. House o f Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Intelligence 
Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, report prepared by 
Warren Nelson, ArchieBarret, Robert Rangel and Christopher Williams, 103"* Cong., 1* 
session., 1992, p. 7.
"” Ibid.. 26.
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threats and the intelligence gaps in this area and produced coordinated assessments 
providing commanders with the best possible idea o f  Iraq’s capabilities and willingness 
to use the weapons.
DIA’s accomplishments in the collection o f intelligence was significantly 
overshadowed by her ability to disseminated the information. DIA already had means for 
dissemination, but over the course o f time, it was realized that the information was not 
getting to the people who needed it soon enough. DIA was routinely producing updated 
orders o f battle, escape and evasion studies, target material as well as BDA information. 
Yet despite its efforts, sometimes, imagery reports were lagging eight days behind before 
they reached CENTCOM.**® DIA eventually established DoDHS (Department o f 
Defense Intelligence Information System) connectivity to pass critical information to 
CENTCOM and other commands. Despite DIA’s best efforts, in the final evaluation, the 
different commands, having purchased different systems, were not always able to receive 
the information they needed. This became one of the major shortfalls o f intelligence 
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm
Overall, the performance of DIA in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was 
outstanding. The agency supported a myriad o f  identified intelligence requirements not 
only fi’om the DIAC and the Pentagon, but also from deployed locations in Riyadh, 
Kuwait and as an intelligence advisor to General Schwartzkopf. In return for their 
outstanding efforts. General Colin Powell presented the agency with their second Joint
no Ibid., 24.
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Meritorious Unit Award for exemplary performance during Desert Storm. General 
Powell considered the overall intelligence effort in this crisis a success.
No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view o f  his adversary 
as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm was a success story. ‘
Congressional Review 
After-Action-Reports indicated that DIA led intelligence support during Desert 
Storm provided commanders with the most complete picture of the enemy ever available 
allowing them to better determine the course o f the o p e r a t i o n . H o w e v e r  despite 
these successes, there were some intelligence problems and shortfalls. A study o f 
intelligence successes and foilure in Desert Storm/Desert Shield was presented by the 
House Committee on Armed Services in which they determined that problems existed in 
all three main areas o f  intelligence: collection, distribution and analysis.
Although collection on the whole was very good, it had some significant 
problems. Intelligence agencies often did not understand the role o f intelligence at the 
command and tactical level, although this was not as significant a problem for DIA. 
Further, CENTCOM commanders were unfemiliar with collection platforms and the type 
o f information that could be derived from them. Therefore, capabilities were not 
exploited to the fullest. The committee recommended more extensive training on 
collection platforms and their capabilities.
Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 20. 
"Ubid., 10.
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As for as dissemination of intelligence information during Desert Storm, the 
committee assessed that it was very poor indeed and went so for to deem it an intelligence 
failure. The key to this lay in the lack o f interoperable hardware. For example, out of 
twelve secondary imagery dissemination systems (SIDS) available in theater, only four 
could communicate with each o t h e r . ' T h i s  problem existed because no service was 
willing to give up its system and adopt another one from a different service and there was 
no one person or group powerful enough to force the issue at the time the SIDS entered 
the picture in the early 1980’s. By the time the SecDef for intelligence was 
strengthened, the money had already been spent and the different systems deployed. 
Therefore, much of the imagery information had to pass through much slower channels 
delaying critical pieces o f information to the commanders. The committee recommended 
“the overall integration o f DoD intelligence resources into a coherent defense intelligence 
community.”
Intelligence analysis o f  information was also deemed a partial failure as there was
no accepted doctrine for devising battle damage assessments and therefore inaccurate
assessments were made. In addition, analysis from national intelligence agencies,
including DIA was often characterized by “wishy-washy” assessments.
The analysis we received was unhelpful. And it was unhelpful because it ended 
up being so caveated . . .  There were so many disclaimers that by the time you got 
done reading many o f the intelligence estimates you received, no matter what 
happened, they would have been right. And that’s not helpful to the guy in the 
field.
U.S. Congress, House 1992, 3. 
Ibid., 22.
115 Ibid., 34.
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However, despite these claims, the committee believed that the assessments o f chemical 
and biological capabilities in Iraq were accurate and indeed helpful. On the other side o f 
the NBC picture, the nuclear estimates were not, due to an apparent lack o f  attention to 
this subject.
. . .  In July 1990, the Defense Intelligence Agency has 42 persons in its 
Washington HQ assigned exclusively to the POW/MIA issue and two assigned to 
Iraq. The former reflects the political sensitivity o f the POW/MIA issue. And 
given recent developments, the numbers assigned to this topic are now rising. '
General Schwarzkopf agreed with these assessments of intelligence feilure and added that
overall intelligence support during the conflict was excellent, however, there was
definitely room for improvement. Out of these recommendations and criticisms, DIA
began to remold its organization once again.
Changes following Desert Storm 
Changes immediately following Desert Storm included improved crisis 
management and support to the decisionmaker and warfigher."’ The agency also 
established the NMJIC replacing the NMIC, as well as retained some o f the positive 
elements of the wartime JIC. DIA improved on NMIST by adding CIA and NSA as 
members and redesignating them NIST’s. The Air Force’s Medical Intelligence Center 
(AFMIC) and the Army’s Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) were added as 
elements of DIA in an effort to further consolidate intelligence analysis and production. 
These were the immediate affects o f intelligence restructuring, however, expanding 
commitments and constricting resources would force a major reorganization in 1993. As
'"Ibid., 36.
Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 21.
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intelligence requirements escalated in view o f  the regional conflicts o f the 1990’s, 
defense cuts once again threatened to weaken the capabilities o f DIA. In an atten^t to 
avoid the intelligence gaps o f  the 1970’s, DIA undertook an extensive reorganization 
from within, “essentially rebuilding the agency from the bottom up and in the process 
enhanced flexibility,” improving coordination with the services and focusing on common 
intelligence areas o f collection, production and infrastructure. This restructuring has 
allowed DIA to continue to provide coordinated, specialized intelligence to military and 
civilian leadership today.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTERS 
DIA’S MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION
As a result o f the lessons o f  Desert Storm, DIA undertook a massive 
reorganization in 1993 from the bottom up -  radically changing its organization to meet 
developing requirements. DIA’s mission evolved over the years since its original charter 
in 1961 which sought to finally organize military intelligence under one Department o f 
Defense umbrella. DIA was established initially to :
- unify the intelligence efforts o f the Department o f Defense
- strengthen DoD capabilities in collection, production, and dissemination o f 
intelligence
- provide efficient allocation and management o f DoD resources
- eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort ' ' *
DIA has undergone no less than six reorganizations in its short history, each time
attempting to adapt its mission with the changing times to adequately support the JCS,
Secretary o f Defense and the individual services. Today, as a Department o f Defense
Combat Support Agency, DIA’s mission is:
To provide timely, objective and cogent military intelligence to warjighters -  
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines -  and to the decisionmakers and policymakers 
o f the U.S. Department o f  Defense and the U.S. Government"^
118 Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 2 1-Year Organizational Overview”, 20.
Defense Intelligence Agency, “Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic 
Plan for DIA”, (Washington DC: DIA Plans, programs and Operations Staff (PO), 
1997), p. 4.
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The Director o f the DIA, appointed by the Secretary o f Defense, reports directly to the 
Secretary through the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff (CJCS). Today, DIA’s 
mission involves support to a wide range o f  intelligence consumers which includes: the 
above mentioned Secretary o f  Defense and CJCS, CINCs o f the military Combatant 
Commands and their subordinate component commanders for carrying out operations, 
and supporting deployed tactical forces. In addition, other “special interest” customers 
include Congress and law enforcement agencies. Designated a Combat Support Agency 
in 1986, DIA was tasked to increase support and cooperation to the U.S. Commands as 
well as to develop joint doctrine.'^® Today in its role as A Combat Support Agency, DIA 
is;
On Duty with the Warfighter, the Defense Policymaker, the Defense Planner 
<with> over 7,000 Women and Men Located Worldwide"‘
DIA’s Organization 
In order to meet the requirements o f the Warfighter, the Policymaker and the 
Decisionmaker, DIA is organized functionally along the lines of: collection, analysis and 
production, dissemination, policy, and administration all tied into the command element 
o f DIA. The military intelligence agency is led by the Director, a three-star general or 
flag officer. The Deputy Director holds the second in command position while the Chief 
o f Staff manages the headquarters element. These missions have changed over the years 
evolving into areas of significant authority today as opposed to the period o f DIA’s
120 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History”. 17.
“A Combat Support Agency”, (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency), 
pamphlet.
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history when the Chief o f  Staff position was eliminated in lieu a  less top-heavy 
organization. The Deputy Director and Chief o f  Staff are both staffed by senior civilian 
executives to create a balance within the agency leadership as DIA is staffed by both 
military and civilian personnel. DIA is staffed by the Military Departments for 
assignment to joint duty as well as by the civilian sector. In his role as a military officer, 
the Director is responsible for employing all the DoD intelligence personnel and 
resources to satisfy DoD requirements.
As for as his intelligence role, the Director o f DIA has the responsibility to advise 
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, Combatant Commanders and 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control and Communications and 
Intelligence (ASDC3I) on matters o f military intelligence in peacetime, during times o f 
crisis or contingencies, and in wartime. The director o f DIA is the head o f the Military 
Intelligence Board (MIB), a committee designed to serve as a forum for discussion on 
defense intelligence requirements as well a forum to assist the director. The MIB serves 
as a advising and decision-making body for DIA and includes the membership of all four 
services intelligence chiefs, and the Director o f NSA. This board is the setting for 
internal discussion on the agencies performance, trends for the future and plans for how 
DIA will adapt to new situations and the needs o f the defense intelligence community.
The director uses this board as a tool in assessing the continuing requirements the agency 
provides to its consumers.
DIA’s director is further tasked to provide a military intelligence contribution to 
national foreign intelligence as well as counterintelligence. This includes providing a
Department o f Defense, Defense Intelligence Agencv. Directive 5105.21 DA&M, 
February 18, 1997, Section E and F.
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coordinated military assessments to National Intelligence Estimates and Special 
Estimates, a task once performed individually by the services. In this function, DIA 
produces integrated military intelligence estimates to decision-makers, effectively 
eliminating duplication o f effort and toning down service rivalries as was the intention of 
the creators o f  the agency in 1961.
Command Element
The command element or headquarters consist o f  the Director (DR), Deputy 
Director (DD), Chief o f  Staff (CS) as well as the Executive Secretariat (ES) 
encompassing the leadership o f the organization. The ES serves to provide 
administrative support to the leadership.
Directly under the headquarters are numerous offices providing a myriad of 
services to DIA, The Director o f Military Intelligence Staff (DM) administers a team to 
provide plans, policies, and programs to manage and coordinate resources, which support 
DIA, the Services and the Unified Commands. This management includes running the 
General Defense Intelligence Program (GDI?) and coordinating defense intelligence 
imputs to the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). The GDIP is part o f the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and includes specialized national 
reconnaissance sub systems and communications intelligence components o f multi-sensor 
systems. DIA’s tasking under the NFIP umbrella includes planning, programming and 
budgeting resources to ensure that the GDIP activities support national and DoD 
intelligence goals, objective and priorities in the overall national reconnaissance picture.
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For the most part, however, GDIP specific activities are classified due to the nature the 
type o f intelligence it involves.
The JMIP, run by the Deputy Secretary o f Defense, was designed to “improve the 
effectiveness o f DoD intelligence activities when those activities involve resources from 
more than one DoD Conqwnent. The JMIP is comprised o f numerous components 
including; Defense Cryptologic Program, Defense Imagery Program, Defense Mapping, 
Charting and Geodesy Program, and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications 
Program. DIA serves as the coordinator for the Defense General Intelligence and 
Applications Program (DGIAP), the largest element o f the JMIP. For DIA’s part, it 
coordinates the activities, and manages the resources of the DGIAP which include the 
following programs: the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program, Defense 
Intelligence Counterdrug Program, Defense Intelligence Agency’s Tactical Program, 
Defense Space Reconnaissance Program and the Defense Intelligence Special 
Technology Program. As the DGIAP comprises the bulk o f  the JMIP participants, DIA 
has a significant role in coordinating defense intelligence activities with other DoD 
agencies. This new role for DIA is one as a coordination body for military intelligence -  
just as the creators o f the agency envisioned in 1961.
The Plans, Programs and Operations Staff (PO) under the command staff o f 
DIA are responsible for internal planning, serve as a Congressional liaison as well as 
provide liaison services for the press, public and foreign attaches. This is an important 
function not only in the coordination o f intelligence around the globe, but also in the role 
o f approved disclosure o f intelligence activities to public agencies and cooperating with
Department o f Defense Directive, 5205.9, Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), 
April 7, 1995.
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Congressional Oversight Programs. This role has grown greatly over the past nearly two 
decades — as the role o f the military expands, so has the role o f intelligence and thus the 
public curiosity o f intelligence activities. The Congressional Liaison Office is 
responsible for keeping the elected representative apprised o f Defense intelligence 
activities as well as justifying DIA operations and expenditures, and answering all valid 
congressional requests on military intelligence activities. PO serves as the liaison for 
DIA in all o f  these activities, playing an growing role in the public awareness o f 
intelligence activities. Other advisory offices also exist to further provide oversight and 
advisory services to the command structure. These support offices form the management 
team for the agency. This separation of administrative support and intelligence support is 
a major departure from the past DIA structure which smattered support and intelligence 
functions in to numerous directorates.
Analysis and Production 
Directorate for Intelligence (J-2)
Analysis and production within DIA is located in three main directorates: 
Directorate for Intelligence (J-2), Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) and the 
Directorate for Policy Support (DP). As there is no established staff officer assigned to 
the Joint Staff who deals with intelligence, DIA informally holds this position as the J-2. 
An officer assigned to DIA acts as the J-2 and reports to the CJCS. The J-2 serves the 
Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Secretary o f Defense, Joint Staff, and Unified 
Commands as the focal point for crisis support and maintains the DoD Indications and
“DIA: Moving Toward the 21** Century”, (Washington DC, DIA Public Liaison 
Office, December 1995), p. 6.
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Warnings Center. The J-2 provides operational and current intelligence to the CJCS on a 
daily basis to keep the chairman abreast o f current developments around the world.
These briefings consist o f political, military and technological topics on various areas o f 
the globe. The J-2 also coordinates joint intelligence doctrine and serves as the Director 
o f the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment.
The J-2 further houses the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to 
support military planning, operations and preparations in the “conduct o f coalition 
operations with international forces.” '^ ® In connection with NMJIC, DIA manages and 
controls the DoD Indications and Warning System (I&W). The I&W system monitors 
activity in countries around the world and displays indicators for crisis in the various 
nations or regions o f the world as a decisionmaking tool for the JCS and Secretary o f 
Defense. The Defense Intelligence Network, also connected with NMJIC, disseminates 
timely, all-source intelligence during crisis periods in a multi-media format.
The J-2 function has evolved over the past 25 years starting as an outgrowth of 
the Joint Intelligence Committee, created by the National Security Act of 1947, which 
provided intelligence in various forms to the JCS during wartime. However, size 
limitations o f the J-2 at that time resulted in an ineffective accomplishment o f the 
mission. After the Reorganization o f 1958, the J-2 was established as part o f  the JCS and 
after DIA was created in 1961, reporting directly to the JCS, the J-2 mission was 
absorbed by the new agency. However, the mission was suspended in 1963 and its duties
“Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA”, p. 10. 
Department o f Defense Directive, 5105.21, Section W.
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assigned to various parts o f  the agency. It was not until 1974 that the duties o f support to 
the JCS were again reorganized and the branch developed to coordinate that support was 
established again as the J-2. From 1974 to current, the J-2 has undergone numerous 
changes, despite the fact that no assigned Joint Staff personnel deal with intelligence,
DIA supports the JCS requirements for intelligence, expanding its capabilities to 
accomplish that mission.
Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI)
The Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) manages the production o f all­
source military intelligence to operational, planning, and policy requirements o f the 
armed forces. Unified Commands, DoD policymakers, and national level agencies 
ensuring production requirements are within DoD and national guidance. DI modifies 
production based on re-evaluations o f mission, technical capabilities and threat 
environment during a crisis. DI’s maintains expertise in: military capabilities, scientific 
and technological advancements, missile, medical, estimative, military production, 
geography, databases, as well as operational and targeting support to tactical, theatre and 
national customers.
One o f the main tasks o f the production arm is to manage crisis-related military 
intelligence support which is accomplished through the Operational Intelligence Crisis 
Center (OICC). The OICC was created in 1986 in response to the large number o f 
hijackings, bombings, and other acts o f terrorism during 1985 to include the hijacking of 
TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO to be an established center for 
crisis management, thereby reducing the time immediate support became available to
127 “Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA”, p. 13.
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DIA’s customers. The performance o f  the OICC in Desert Storm proved its capabilities 
in providing intelligence support for CENTCOM before and during the crisis. The 
OICC’s existence today is a result o f  the outstanding support it provided. It continues to 
be DIA’s primary tool for managing joint analytical support and production in crisis 
situations.
Further, for specified intelligence requirements, the production branch also 
manages the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) and the Armed Forces 
Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) to provide expertise to its military and civilian 
intelligence customers. Previously associated with the Army and Air Force respectively, 
MSIC and AFMIC became elements o f  DIA in 1992 in a continuing effort to consolidate 
intelligence making it more effective and efficient. MSIC analysts produce scientific 
and technological (S & T) intelligence on foreign missile systems and directed energy 
weapons. It is the primary source o f information on: short range ballistic missiles, anti­
tank guided missiles, defensive missile systems, as well as the aforementioned directed 
energy weapons providing threat analysis through testing of foreign systems obtained or 
assessed via the foreign material exploitation program. In line with the mission o f the 
Intelligence Production Directorate, MSIC operates 24 hours during crisis situations as 
well to give expert analysis on threats to deployed forces and operations worldwide.
The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) provides the U.S. 
intelligence community with the unique capability to provide assessments on foreign, 
civilian and military healthcare, foreign biological warfare capabilities and health risk
“Missile and Space Intelligence Center” (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 1995), pamphlet.
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factors around the w o r l d . A F M I C  supports U.S. forces on a 24-hour basis when 
required and provides assessments o f potential health threats to leadership as troops 
prepare for deployments allowing for medical preparations and immunizations to troops, 
thereby increasing mission effectiveness. Both MSIC and AFMIC give DIA an expanded 
community o f  intelligence experts available to produce estimates on enemy capabilities 
directly to the military services or as part o f  an overall assessment o f the capabilities o f a 
potential enemy in NIE’s. The acquisition o f these two centers not only broadened DIA’s 
intelligence capabilities but also gave DIA additional credibility in their intelligence 
support.
Intelligence Collection 
Directorate for Operations 
The all source intelligence collection capabilities o f  DIA are contained in the 
Directorate o f Operations. The DO manages all DoD intelligence collection requirements 
in support o f  national and theater commanders. This includes the management o f the 
DoD HUMENT Service (DHS) and operation o f the Defense Attache System.
Defense HUMINT System 
In October 1995, DIA assumed the duties o f managing all DoD HUMINT 
collections as another step in streamlining the intelligence community. Until then, under 
the direction o f the National Security Act o f 1947, the separate military services 
maintained and operated their own HUMINT collections. Their operations included 
clandestine and overt collection. In using clandestine collection, the services recruited
“Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center” (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 1995), pamphlet.
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members o f  foreign military to provide the U.S. with classified information. Overt 
collection consisted mainly o f military officers acquiring information through debriefing 
individuals such as defectors or obtaining foreign publications, etc.*^° The Army had the 
most well developed HUMINT program housed in the Army Foreign Intelligence 
Activity division as well as Military Intelligence Brigades with members o f  these 
divisions stationed all around the globe. While the Army’s program was relatively large 
and enjoyed a steady role in Army intelligence until the merge into DIA, the naval role in 
HUMINT has waxed and waned since WWII. The Office o f  Naval Intelligence 
conducted numerous HUMINT operations during WWII, however shortly after the end o f 
the war, naval participation in this area o f intelligence can be described as negligible.'^'
It was revived in the 1960’s in Task Force 157, which conducted clandestine HUMINT 
operations, only to be disestablished again in 1976. However, Task Force 168 took over 
the non-clandestine operations and conducted HUMINT operations during the Gulf War. 
Air Force participation in HUMINT has also waffled. Originally prohibited by the Air 
Force in 1948, information collected by Air Attache’s during the Korean War convinced 
the service o f the utility o f  such intelligence. DIA has also collected HUMINT since its 
inception in 1962 through two basic channels: the Defense Attache System, and a 
specialized group o f clandestine case officers.
Richelson, Jeffrey T., ‘Trom the MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE: The 
Consolidation o f U.S. Defense HUMINT,” International Journal o f  Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence Vol 10, Number 2 (1995): 133.
Richelson, “From the MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE”, 134.
Ibid, 135.
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Despite the services’ freedom to collect HUMINT information, the CIA’s DCI 
served as a coordinator for all activities so as to deconflict operations worldwide. When 
DIA was created, it took a more active role in managing DoD human intelligence 
collection. However, these efforts met with resistance from the armed services, 
especially the Navy who said that DIA’s attempt to “streamline or coordinate HUMINT 
activities” was not a meaningful attençt.*^^ The first attempts at consolidating all 
HUMINT activities occurred in 1982 but was vetoed by Congress as it was perceived to 
be an effort to create a mini-CIA within the DIA -  staffing it with civilians. Eight years 
later as a result o f the end of the Cold War and a subsequent cutting o f the defense 
budget. Congress instructed the services to find a way to consolidate their HUMINT 
efforts. This led to a plan which would give resources and operational control to DIA. 
Met by massive resistance from the Army it wasn’t until 1992 that a plan was developed 
to combine HUMINT efforts under DIA. This plan called for “centralized management 
and decentralized execution o f <HUMINT> activities.” '^ '* The process o f 
implementation began before the actual turnover in October o f 1995, gradually 
incorporating the elements of the different services.
Defense Attache System 
As with HUMINT collection, the separate services also originally maintained 
their own attaches per a 1949 DoD Directive that stated “each Military Service is
Ibid, 137. 
Ibid, 143.
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individually responsible for its own Attache System .. However, for a period of time 
the Secretary o f Defense established a department to coordinate these activities setting 
the precedent for the involvement of DIA at a later date. Poor distribution, high costs, 
and duplication o f effort -  a recurring theme in the intelligence business it seems, led to 
Mr. McNamara’s decision to incorporate the attaché system within DIA in 1964. Once 
again the services opposed this new direction for assumption o f duties under one 
organization. However, ‘the necessity for coordinating the activities of the attaches 
abroad and the attaches potential for collecting intelligence valuable to DIA served to 
override the Services’ objections..
Defense Attaches stationed abroad have a variety of methods they collect 
intelligence:
- identifying and capturing collection opportunities presented by trade fairs, 
military demonstrations, parades,. . .
- identifying and gaining cooperation o f  human sources believed to posses the 
ability to furnish intelligence irformation
- traveling to identified geographic target areas to observe, photograph, and 
report irformation specifically needed by consumers
- identifying, establishing contact, and maintaining liaison with foreign military 
officers who.. .  can supply the potential intelligence information. ..
- gaining and maintaining area reality to observe and report political, 
sociological, psychological and economic developments.. .
- identifying and gaining access to assist in the acquisition and exploitation of  
foreign military equipment and material"^
Since its beginning in 1965, the DAS has undergone numerous organizational changes
but for the most part exists today as a consolidated military Attache service.
Defense Intelligence Agency, “The Defense Attaché”, (Washington, DC: DIA 
History Office, 1994), p.l.
'"Ib id .
Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Communitv. 246.
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Dissemination o f Intelligence Products 
Directorate for Information Systems and Services 
Directorate for Information Systems and Services (DS) manages DIA’s 
information technology and services. Specifically, DS provides: data processing 
engineering, development and operations siqjport, information and library services, 
hardcopy and electronic publication, imagery processing, video and visual information 
services, as well as the dissemination o f these services.'^* This section also manages the 
Department o f Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) which effectively 
maintains a database o f products available and required by each unit, c o mmand, or 
agency.
In addition to the DODIIS system, DIA manages an information and 
communication network called JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
System) which securely coimects collectors, producers and consumers o f intelligence 
information together on one main “intelligence superhighway” whether in the US or 
deployed anywhere worldwide. JWICS incorporates advanced technologies to 
incorporate multi-media technology and video teleconferencing. The smaller, sister to 
JWICS is JDISS ( Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System) which provides a 
transportable communication network.'^’ These systems supply all-source-integrated 
intelligence critical to theatre battle management. These systems are the key to DIA’s 
continued efforts to improve dissemination to its consumers, especially in the wake of 
intelligence criticism o f Desert Storm which included problems in product dissemination.
“Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA”, p. 14. 
Ibid. p. 16-19.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
87
Further, DIA’s forward-looking vision for the future includes better integrated systems 
and intelligence products on-line to increase the usability o f  its products. This will be a 
major area o f growth for the agency as the 21** century approaches.
Administration 
Directorate for Administration 
The Directorate for Administration (DA) provides not only administrative support 
but also training both for internal DIA members as well as external customers (Joint 
Military Intelligence Training Center) and houses the Counterintelligence and Security 
Activity which identifies foreign threats to DIA’s intelligence activities.
The Counterintelligence and Security Activity (DAC) is the central point for 
coordinating issues on counterintelligence -  recognizing and dealing with foreign threats 
to intelligence collection by DIA. In addition, DAC provides staff support to the CJCS 
and the combatant commands essentially providing them with the same investigation and 
evaluation services. Counterintelligence analysis o f  foreign capabilities to detect US 
intelligence activity provides intelligence collectors with information on how to better 
protect sources, the flow o f information as well as protection o f other collection means. 
DAC also serves as a coordination point for Counterintelligence activities conducted by 
other services and agencies.
Obviously, the administrative directorate in DIA provides much more than just 
administrative services. The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) 
manages the General Intelligence Training System for the Department o f Defense 
ensuring training is provided in management, analysis, collection management, and 
systems as well as basic training for all DIA job positions, as well as prepares military
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and civilian personnel for joint duty in the intelligence world. The Defense Intelligence 
College (DIG), managed by the General Intelligence Training System, is tasked to 
conduct academic research on topics that are significant to the present and future 
intelligence community as well as prepare attaches for duty in the Defense Attaché 
System. The DIG also prepares both military and civilian intelligence personnel for duty 
as senior commanders, staff and policy-making positions in the intelligence field. These 
academic branches o f DIA grew out o f the 1970’s realization of the growing importance 
of intelligence and the need for training as well as to enable military and civilians alike to 
make a career in intelligence, giving the field more respectability. In addition to these, 
DIA also runs the Gongressionally established Joint Military Intelligence Go liege, located 
at Bolling AFB, Washington, D.G.
The Joint Military Intelligence Go liege is a unique joint service intelligence 
school authorized by Gongress. The institution awards accredited Master o f Science o f 
Strategic Intelligence degrees to its graduates, better preparing both military and civilian 
students o f intelligence throughout the US Intelligence Gommunity. This is a unique 
degree, available only through the joint institution. In addition, the college also sponsors 
and conducts research on intelligence issues, disseminating its findings to the intelligence 
community at large.
Interaction with other Intelligence Agencies 
Service Branches
While many aspects of defense intelligence have been absorbed into DIA for 
overall military intelligence management, all four separate services continue to maintain 
intelligence elements within their ranks. Why? DIA was created not to take the place o f
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services intelligence functions, but to align significant intelligence assets in order to 
provide strategic and tactical intelligence to OSD, JCS, and Unified and Specified 
Commands. DIA’s charter specified its relationship with the services and defined it 
principle role as an advisor to the JCS, OSD, Defense Agencies and the Commands. 
Furthermore, DIA coordinated all National Intelligence Estimates for the USIB 
representing all o f  the services. Before DIA, the separate services each provided NIE’s 
A ^ch for the most part were slanted toward service requirements and goals. Basically, 
DIA took over representation o f the separate services in higher intelligence discussions, 
providing a coordinated view fi'om the defense department. As DIA established this new 
role, it assumed some of the key responsibilities o f the services. In some cases this 
included consolidating some o f the services activities, such as the attaché functions and 
HUMINT functions. For the most part, however, the services retain their intelligence 
capabilities in order to provide commanders with tactical intelligence relating to 
individual missions on a daily basis and in times o f crisis. General Carroll, the first DIA 
director responded to the House Committee on Appropriations criticism o f DIA’s role 
indicating that.
By design, the Services still retained very significant prerogatives and 
responsibilities in the preparation o f major items o f military intelligence. . . .  By 
the very broad nature o f national-level requirements to which DIA products in 
general respond, the tactical usability factor often declines as the intelligence 
products is disseminated from the Washington level through the major commands 
and down to the commanders in the field.
DIA as the primary producer o f all intelligence documents, produces intelligence studies
used by the military services for overall intelligence support, however the services must
also produce intelligence that relates to their specific functions as DIA could not possibly
140 Allen,. “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 112.
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produce all products for all services at a competent level. In essence, this was a result o f
the very distinct difference between national and tactical intelligence. Lyman
Kirkpatrick, former CIA Inspector General wrote in 1973, further explaining the distinct
role o f DIA and the individual services.
The DIA was conceived as an organization to assist in the coordination o f the 
military contributions to national estimates, to produce the current intelligence 
essential to top officials . . .  and to supervise the military intelligence collection 
effort in order to eliminate duplication. The . . .  service intelligence agencies.. .  
were to continue to process the specialized intelligence essential to their services.
141
So, what does DIA do for the services? To begin, the agency is staffed not only by 
civilian intelligence analysts, but also by all o f the services on a rotating basis. The 
services assign personnel to the agency to assist in intelligence production ensuring that 
the individual services are an active part in DIA’s intelligence production. DIA produces 
the majority o f  intelligence documents disseminated to the defense community, many o f 
which are used by the services intelligence branches in their daily missions. These 
include documents such as Military Capabilities Studies (MGS), Orders o f Battle, and 
other comprehensive intelligence studies that all o f the services use as a base line source 
for intelligence estimates. Along this line, DIA also manages communication products to 
such as JDISS and JWICS which serve to tie together intelligence communication among 
all the services and DIA. Overall DIA serves as a coordinator o f information at the 
national level leaving tactical intelligence activities to the services who are able to 
provide the service specific information to their commanders.
DIA also interacts with other intelligence agencies abroad, coordinating 
intelligence information. DIA has established liaisons with Britain, Canada, and
Kirkpatrick, 35-36.
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Australia with whom a vast amount o f intelligence cooperation is maintained. For 
cooperation with the British Defense Intelligence Staff, the parameters o f the “mutual 
intelligence interests”*'*^ were established via the DIA/DIS Agreement in 1969. Under 
this agreement, various U.S./UK. intelligence programs were consolidated into one DIA 
Liaison Detachment located in London. In addition, DIA maintains a Liaison 
Detachment in Ottawa, Canada, to coordinate U.S./Canadian intelligence activities.
Conclusion
DIA’s organization has undergone numerous periods o f reorganization since its 
creation in 1961. These reorganizations were both results o f congressional criticism and 
internal checks within the agency to improve the quality o f  intelligence output to the 
users. Advancements were made in leaps and bounds after Desert Storm in 1991 as a 
result o f  the high quality o f intelligence provided during the war and the experience, 
preciseness and speed o f intelligence required to conduct a successful campaign. Desert 
Storm is the basis from which intelligence has grown tremendously in only the last eight 
years. Even today, DIA is preparing for the 21® century and improving upon current 
systems.
142 Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 137.
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CHAPTER IV 
DIA’S FUTURE ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE
The international environment has changed greatly in the post Cold War World. 
The bi-polar world characterized by U.S./Soviet dominance for the most part kept in 
check regional political and religious conflict. Since the collapse o f  the Soviet Union in 
1989, these conflicts have begun to escalate as evidenced in nations around the globe. 
The renewed conflicts have also served as an impetus for efforts to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons. Additionally, advances in 
communications while increasing intelligence gathering capabilities have also increased 
the likelihood o f information war&re. In light of these changing world situations, the 
U.S. and its military are frequently called on to stabilize regional conflicts, serve in 
humanitarian aid and defend growing national interests.
In addition to restructuring for the present world environment, DIA has also 
constructed a view o f the future and a vision for adapting intelligence needs to supply the 
war-fighter, policymaker and decision-maker with the tools they need to ensure 
America’s continuance as a globally dominant power. In a recent report to the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, DIA outlined its perspective on the threats and 
challenges facing the United States in the next decade. For the most part. Lieutenant 
General Patrick M. Hughes, DIA Director, concluded that the U.S. will continue to be 
highly involved in a growing complexity o f  international situations to include:
92
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peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-narcotics, humanitarian emergencies, non- 
combatant evacuations, military assistance, and limited conflict when absolutely 
necessary.*"*  ^ This increasingly broad military mission will require a new direction for 
intelligence in order to be able to support military action taken at any time and as often is 
necessary simultaneous operations as well. Where will these events take place around the 
world?
Currently, a plethora o f nations continue to pose direct threats to U.S. national 
security. North Korea, a threat since the 1950’s, continues to remain in crisis -  
politically, economically and militarily. Despite these bleak circumstances however, they 
have made gains in WMD programs as well as continuing upgrades in missile technology 
and strengthening their special forces. As U.S. forces continue a presence in South 
Korea, these advances remain a plausible threat to American interests. Also in Asia, 
China’s rapid modernization both economically and militarily poses an increasing threat 
as the worlds largest remaining  Communist power. A potential revolutionary power 
China possesses a determinant to regain Taiwan into Chinese territory. On the same 
continent, Russia too continues to be a valid threat as she still maintains a sizeable 
nuclear force. A depressed economy and declining military presence have resulted in 
internal disorder as Russia attempts to forge a new role in international politics. Nearby, 
the Middle East, a flashpoint fbr generations will continue to draw U.S. attention in 
obvious areas including Iraq and Iran as these revolutionary states attempt to assert their 
power in the region. India and Pakistan’s ongoing rivalry remains an important security 
concern as both countries continue to view their situation as a zero-sum game and both
General Patrick M. Hughes, Director DIA, “Global Threats and Challenges in the 
Decade Ahead,” Report for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998.
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retain the potential to assemble WMD including nuclear weapons. Further, regions like 
Bosnia and Sub-Sahara Africa will continue to conflict over religious and racial issues. 
Overall these nations pose threats to the current balance o f power, and thereby could 
potentially draw the U.S. into their crisis. These worldwide situations continue to ebb 
and wane, increasing the need for adaptable military intelligence.
In addition to the growing world conflicts, there also exists a transnational threat. 
Included in this group is the continued proliferation o f  nuclear, chemical biological and 
conventional weapons. DIA assesses that, “more than 20 states are actively pursuing 
weapons o f mass destruction, motivated either by regional competition or the desire to 
develop a deterrent or counter to the concomitant superiority o f others, including the 
U.S.” '**^ International terrorism is another threat transcending national borders, and a 
paramount security concern for America both domestically and abroad. American troops 
are being deployed to increasingly more areas o f the world and often the mere presence 
o f the U.S. in a hostile region will spark terrorist activity as evidenced in the Khobar 
Towers attack o f 1996. For this reason, intelligence must maintain standing efforts to 
assess capabilities and plausibility for terrorist action on a grand scale -  a  difficult task as 
these groups grow, splinter and change on almost a daily basis. Aside from the obvious 
military implications o f the first two transnational threats, international narcotics 
trafficking, and organized crime are growing problems in which the U.S. military may be 
required to “lend a hand.” These actions pose a threat to the stability o f  a nation. The 
influence o f these such groups could pose a serious threat to an unstable government, 
such as that o f  Russia and ultimately might, once again, affect the balance o f  power in a
144,General Patrick M. Hughes
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region. The final transnational threat is a new one created as a result o f the 
communications revolution, information warfore. While this revolution has sparked 
better information processing, transmission and storage, it has also made it possible to 
commit electronic theft, data modification, and shut down systems entirely. The 
implications are innumerable: including the leaking of classified information or the 
collapse o f a critical system during a crisis period. Intelligence efforts to counter these 
threats are crucial to protect information. Some aspects o f all o f  these transnational 
threats have national security implications that will continue to involve the U.S. military 
capability in the future.
International as well as transnational threats in combination with the constantly 
changing nature o f warfere calls for constant attention to national strategy, doctrine, force 
structure and weapons development. All o f these amidst a shrinking defense budget. The 
trend has been to decrease defense spending in the post Cold War era due to a perceived 
lessening o f threats. However, as previously and specifically noted, the international 
scene in the wake the collapse o f the Soviet Union has created a more dangerous, less 
predictable world in which the U.S. is the primary power. The aforementioned concerns 
and threats are much widened from the previous almost single target o f  aggression -  the 
Soviet Union. America used to look at the world in terms of how a conflict would affect 
the balance o f power between the U.S. and the Soviets. However, now, the intelligence 
community must be able to assess how regional conflicts may threaten U.S. interests -  a 
much broader task. How do you rectify a shrinking budget with increasing responsibility 
when it comes to intelligence? It is a difficult task. Just as the military itself now has to
'■** Report from the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities o f  the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, 1996.
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“do more with less”, so must the intelligence community. DIA has responded to this task 
with its plan for adapting intelligence to future requirements -  a plan for the twenty-first 
century -  Vector 21.
DIA is committed to providing the best possible military intelligence support to 
commanders engaged in planning and acting in contingencies or crises. In efforts to 
continually upgrade its capabilities with the changing environment, DIA emphasized six 
areas to concentrate their efforts: Mission, People, Technology, Infrastructure, Readiness 
and Relationships. DIA’s mission will continue to enq)hasize intelligence support to the 
war-fighter, decision-maker and policymaker. In efforts to intensify this support, DIA 
plans to strength their internal Military Intelligence Board as a forum to match defense 
intelligence needs and efforts, streamlining the process to expedite decision-making on 
important intelligence issues. These issues include the collection, analysis and production 
o f intelligence. Overall, DIA’s emphasis on collection will be focused on the war-fighter 
and defense department needs, enhancing the Defense HUMINT service to encompass 
joint capabilities and operations as well as expanding the MASINT mission to support 
consumers needs in peace, crisis or war times. In an effort to upgrade analysis 
capabilities to make them more timely to the war-fighter, DIA has plans to establish an 
Intelligence Analyst Development program as a training aid to improve analysis. This 
effort ties in with DIA’s emphasis on the people in the agency. Additionally, in order to 
disseminate analysis quickly during critical periods, the agency conceived a process to 
provide immediate analytic efforts focused on 24-hour support to deploying forces 
including targeting and planning. Standardizing intelligence products and integrating
146 Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History”, 25.
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diverse intelligence systems which provide these products is a significant goal and hurdle
DIA is focused on overcoming. This was one o f the areas in which intelligence failed to
effectively perform during Desert Storm and DIA is determined to rectify and consolidate
from the upper echelon. In keeping with the goal o f  real-time intelligence to the war-
fighter, DIA is currently in the process o f distributing products online and in alternate
media forms to forces both stateside and deployed. Part o f this process is currently
displayed on DIA’s homepage on the Intelligence Link (INTELINK) system whereby
units, and commands have access to electronic products from DIA -  decreasing not only
costs but also the time factor for passing critical information.
As technology advances by leaps and bounds, DIA plans to be right in the center
o f the activity, keeping up with new ideas and integrating them into the intelligence
process in an effort to speed intelligence support to the user. This is an important aspect
in a growing technologically dominated world.
The Defense Intelligence Agency’s vision for the 21® century is highly systems- 
centered. Advances in sensor, information processing, and communications 
technologies will lead to capabilities that will enable the United States to achieve 
and maintain information dominance. Automated data processing and 
telecommunications systems are resource multipliers, providing the Intelligence 
Community the ability to connect reliably, directly and instantly to knowledge, 
resources and capabilities at all levels. .
Ultimately, DIA plans to link the Defense intelligence structure, national-level
intelligence, U.S. and Allied cooperation, active and reserve intelligence units together to
provide experience and skill as a whole to the community at large. As part o f the original
DIA charter to consolidate the defense intelligence efforts, DIA continues to bring all
147 Ibid.
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related national level efforts under its wing centralizing them at the agency’s 
headquarters at DIAC on Bolling Air Force Base. This is necessary to ensure that the 
agency is ready at a moments notice to perform its duties as a Combat Support Agency. 
All o f  DIA’s efforts are in preparation to be “prepared, properly manned, trained, and 
equipped to execute the mission” in times o f crisis. Lastly, in its plan for the future o f 
defense intelligence, DIA must strengthen its relationships with other intelligence 
agencies as well as foreign governments, not only to prevent duplication, but share 
information, ensuring compatibility in order to provide the best overall picture to 
decision-makers at critical times in the future.
Defense intelligence is a supreme task to which DIA was given a significant part. 
On the whole, the defense intelligence community including NSA, the NRG, and the 
military intelligence units could benefit from a stronger role o f DIA, however, that 
question o f power is still under debate today as it has been since before DIA’s creation. 
The agency was created to integrate military intelligence in such a manner to provide a 
succinct picture to national leadership. Its mission differs greatly from the CIA who 
concentrates more on the political aspect o f intelligence guiding leadership in foreign 
policymaking, etc. DIA's mission is specific: intelligence support to defense leadership 
and unified commands and now to the war-fighter as well. No matter how broad DIA’s 
mission is, in supporting the war-fighter, it can not take the place o f service intelligence 
operations. Only the services know the particulars o f  the men and machines they must 
support and only the services can provide the immediacy, urgency and confidence the 
man behind the machine must know to do his job. DIA’s achievements are not be 
overshadowed by what they are not chartered to do, however. As DIA borders on four
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decades o f military intelligence service, they have surpassed the vision for which they 
were created and are a necessary and vital member o f the U.S. intelligence community.
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